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TRIAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEWSGATHERING
PROCESS
C. Thomas Dienes *
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1990s produced a number of sensational criminal and civil
trials. The media and public avidly followed the murder trials of
O.J. Simpson and the Menendez brothers, the Oklahoma City
bombing trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, and the
trial of those charged in the World Trade Center bombing. Civil
trials involving products liability, medical malpractice, environ-
mental pollution; the civil trial of O.J. Simpson; Paula Jones's
sexual harassment action against President Clinton; and the no-
torious antitrust case against Microsoft similarly captured the
public's attention. Also, as might be expected, trial judges and the
legal system generally grappled with questions concerning the ef-
fects of potentially harmful publicity on the administration of jus-
tice.' Most of the attention naturally concerned the potential
prejudicial effect of media coverage in criminal cases on the fair
trial rights of the defendant.2 Even when the publicity is gener-
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
B.S., Loyola University, Chicago; J.D., Northwestern University; Ph.D., Northwestern
University. The author was General Counsel at U.S. News and World Report and contin-
ues to serve as Legal Consultant to U.S. News and Fast Company Magazine.
I wish to thank Professors David Anderson, Jerome A. Barron, Thomas Morgan,
Rodney A. Smolla, and Robert Tuttle, and Lee Levine of Levine, Sullivan & Koch for re-
viewing this article. I also wish to express my appreciation to Jennifer A. Karmonick, a
recent graduate of the George Washington University Law School, for her valuable re-
search assistance.
1. See generally C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW (2d ed.
1999) (providing much of the background material for this article).
2. See generally TIMOTHY R. MURPHY ET AL., MANAGING NOTORIOUS TRIALS (2d ed.
1998); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON
THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 15.28 (1996); HARvEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL.,
MODERN COMMIJNICATION LAW (1999); Thomas F. Liotti, Closing the Courtroom Door to
the Public: Whose Rights Are Violated?, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 501 (1997); Lance R. Peterson,
Note, A First Amendment-Sixth Amendment Dilemma: Manuel Noriega Pushes the Ameri-
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ated by the defense in criminal cases, however, there is concern
for the effect of outside influences on the courtroom proceedings.3
Similarly, the potential for harmful publicity in civil cases, e.g.,
disclosure of trade secrets, private personal matters, or other con-
fidential information, stimulates judicial and legislative concern.
When the legal system moves to combat such harmful public-
ity, however, it confronts limitations imposed by the First
Amendment. Supreme Court precedent has sharply curtailed di-
rect sanctions against the media for prejudicial publicity and re-
straining orders (gag orders) on media publication. Demanding
standards of justification, such as the clear and present danger
doctrine and strict scrutiny, generally make such regulation un-
available.'
Indirect regulation of the media, however, is a different mat-
ter.6 It is believed, probably mistakenly, that if the media is pre-
vented from obtaining access to the sources of information, the
potential for harmful publicity can be curtailed. Some indirect
regulations, such as complete or partial closure of judicial pro-
ceedings, are subject to significant First Amendment limitations.
can Judicial System to the Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
563 (1992); Mark R. Stabile, Note, Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in a
Highly Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 GEO. L.J. 337 (1990); Symposium, Impact of the Me-
dia on Criminal Trials, 4 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1 (1997); Symposium, The Right to a Fair
Trial, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1.
3. See, for example, Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), which involved disci-
plinary action against defense counsel for extrajudicial comments. See infra Part III.B
(discussing Gentile). Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that our criminal justice system is
founded upon the following principle:
The outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by impartial jurors, who know
as little as possible of the case, based on material admitted into evidence be-
fore them in a court proceeding. Extrajudicial comments on, or discussion of,
evidence which might never be admitted at trial and ex parte statements by
counsel giving their version of the facts obviously threaten to undermine this
basic tenet.
Id. at 1070. This principle applies to all extrajudicial commentary.
4. Witness the extensive publicity involving the sexual harassment proceedings in-
volving President Clinton and Paula Jones. See Jones v. Clinton, 12 F. Supp. 2d 931 (E.D.
Ark. 1998). See also Gerald T. Wetherington et al., Preparing for the High Profile Case: An
Omnibus Treatment for Judges and Lawyers, 51 FLA. L. REV. 425 (1999) (discussing both
criminal and civil cases). See generally DIENES, supra note 1, at 128-36, 266-81; Martha
McElveen Ezzard, Confidentially in Civil Proceedings: Public Access Versus Litigant's Pri-
vacy, 22 COLO. LAW. 2237 (1993); Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Fam-
ily Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POLy REV. 155
(1999) (comparing California and New York state law regarding press access to juvenile
proceedings and the balancing of public interest and privacy concerns).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part II.C.
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But judicial restraining orders or standing rules on speech by
trial participants generally, and by attorneys in particular, enjoy
a much greater likelihood of success.' Indeed, Supreme Court
precedent, especially Gentile v. State Bar,' which held that a
state, pursuant to a standing rule, can constitutionally sanction
lawyer speech that is "substantially likely" to prejudice a defen-
dant's fair trial rights,9 invites use of such restraints as standing
rules and gag orders to limit lawyer speech. I believe that, in the
years following the O.J. Simpson cases and Gentile, there has
been an increasing use of broad, sweeping judicial gag orders on
trial participants, including lawyers, prohibiting them from
speaking to the press concerning trial proceedings.
Consider how the process works. A crime occurs and the inves-
tigation begins. The vast media network communicates ongoing
events to the public. Public discussion develops, aided now by the
expanding availability of the Internet. Investigative journalists
may unearth previously unknown information, but most of the
news comes from government sources. A person or persons are
arrested and charged with the crime. If it is a major event, the
government often will issue press releases, conduct press confer-
ences, and give media interviews. Reporters for the major media
may pick up the breaking news directly, but, in any case, the
newswires and copying among the media will carry the news to
media outlets around the country and the world. The persons
charged and their legal representatives may feel the need to re-
spond-more press conferences and interviews develop and
spread the news to the public. Other persons with information
concerning the crime may tell their stories to the media, which
then carries the news to the public. Commentary in the media
will develop; the events will be discussed publicly. All of this
takes place against the background of pre-arrest publicity con-
cerning the crime. As the criminal proceedings continue, the me-
dia continues to communicate the news to the public. Govern-
ment, interested parties, the media, and the public are in a
constantly evolving communication process.
If this interactive process is interrupted by improper, poorly
fashioned restraints, there is a danger that the process will be
7. See infra Part II.D.
8. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); see also infra notes 172-209 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Gentile).
9. Id. at 1076.
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skewed. It seems unlikely that indirect restraints would curtail
trial publicity, but they might change the way in which news-
gathering occurs and, therefore, what is published. They may
significantly burden the newsgathering process. For example, it
seems likely that journalists would rely more on leaks. ° Because
government officials are more likely to have established relation-
ships with journalists, greater use of leaks and "confidential
sources" might produce a bias. On the other hand, it has been
suggested that defense lawyers depend heavily on the media to
communicate with the public." Reliance on other unidentified
sources also may produce a greater amount of inaccurate infor-
mation or at least information where the public will not know the
biases of the informant. 2 There really is very little empirical in-
formation on the effect of indirect restraints on the newsgather-
ing process.
The legal system responds. Judges may seek to close or par-
10. See, for example, David A. Anderson, Democracy and the Demystification of
Courts: An Essay, 14 REV. LITIG. 627, 636, 639 (1995), which argues:
The principal effect of... the hundreds of rules and gag orders.., has been
to drive the sources of trial publicity underground .... Now [trial partici-
pants] speak clandestinely to selected media. Leaked information is a form of
currency that can be used to reward friends and punish enemies, and perhaps
thereby manipulate coverage .... Without power to directly control the me-
dia, the goal of controlling pretrial and trial publicity is unattainable.
Id. For another example, see Laurie L. Levenson, Foreword to Symposium, The Sound of
Silence: Reflections on the Use of the Gag Order, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 305, 309 (1997),
in which Levenson states, "I doubt that gag orders will ever work to stem the tide of leaks
of information that inevitably occur in a high-profile case. Instead, they tend to drive the
media underground and put a premium on clever media manipulation."
11. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 635. Anderson notes that prosecutors are politi-
cians who "operate in a high-visibility business where success and advancement are often
aided by publicity." Id. He adds: "Most defense lawyers are not in politics, but for them
too, publicity is important as a source of business and professional recognition." Id. See
also Michael E. Swartz, Note, Trial Participant Speech Restrictions Gagging First
Amendment Rights, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1411, 1422 (1990) ("After an indictment, public
opinion weighs heavily against the accused.... The defendant's interest in rebutting
charges is at its peak. The criminally accused have an interest in promptly and publicly
responding to charges so they may counter injury to themselves, their families, or their
friends.") (footnotes omitted).
12. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Leaks, Gags and Shield: Taking Responsibility, 37 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 943, 950-56 (1997). Uelmen examines the motivations that prosecutors and
defense attorneys have for communicating with the media. He argues:
Rather than suppress the barrage of publicity surrounding high profile cases,
however, these [indirect restraints] more often spur the media to a relentless
pursuit of even more questionable sources of information.... Rather than
seeking to suppress identifiable sources of information, our goal should be to
encourage the flow of information to the public that is attributed to an identi-
fied source, who takes public responsibility for its accuracy and appropriate-
ness. The public, including potential jurors, will then be better equipped to
critically evaluate the information, and assess its reliability and credibility.
Id. at 944-45.
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tially close pretrial proceedings, but First Amendment precedent
severely limits their ability to do so.'" Even when closure occurs,
leaks to the media do provide selective, perhaps inaccurate, in-
formation. Other pre-existent restraints may restrict the flow of
information and commentary. For example, standing disciplinary
rules are designed to limit what lawyers can say. 4 Moreover,
judges can, and increasingly do, issue restraining (gag) orders
prohibiting speech by trial participants to the public and press. 5
Often, such gag orders are sweeping restraints on speech. In
the O.J. Simpson civil case, for example, Judge Fujisaki issued
the following order: "[This] Court makes an oral order that no
counsel may discuss anything connected with this trial with the
media or in public places. This order encompasses all parties, at-
torneys and witnesses under the control of counsel. Counsel may
inform the media and the public of the order." 6 In the trial of
those accused of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center,
Judge Duffy drafted his gag order as follows:
There will be no more statements [in the press, on TV, in radio, or in
any other electronic media] issued by either side or their agents. The
next time I pick up a paper and see a quotation from any of you, you
had best be prepared to have some money. The first time will be
$200. Thereafter, the fines will be squared.' 7
Chief Judge Richard Matsch's order in the Oklahoma City
bombing trial of Timothy McVeigh was somewhat less sweeping,
but broad nevertheless:
ORDERED that all of the lawyers appearing in this case, together
with any persons associated with them, the defendant, personnel in
all law enforcement agencies involved in this case, and all court per-
sonnel are prohibited from making any comments or statements out-
side the courtroom, concerning any of the evidence, court rulings and
opinions regarding the trial proceedings and anything concerning
13. See infra Part 1.C.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. Notice of Motion and Motion for an Order Vacating the Portion of the Court's
August 13, 1996 Order Restricting Comment by Parties, Witnesses and Attorneys at *12,
Rufo v. Simpson, 1996 WL 512006 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1996) (Nos. SC031947,
SC036340 and SC036876) [hereinafter "Notice of Motion"]; see infra text accompanying
notes 326-36 (discussing Judge Fujisaki's implementation of the gag order and appellate
review of the order).
17. United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Hearing
Transcript at 33-34, Apr. 1, 1993); see also infra text accompanying notes 344-48 (dis-
cussing the Second Circuit's decision to overturn Judge Duffy's gag order).
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the jury which a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated
by any means of public communication.
1 8
Although restraints on trial participants only indirectly burden
media publication, they are subject to First Amendment limita-
tions.19 While it is newsgathering, rather than publication, that is
restrained, newsgathering is constitutionally protected, albeit to
a lesser extent than publication. 0 In this Article, I argue that the
increasing use of standing rules and broad gag orders directed at
trial participants, especially lawyers, is a significant interference
with the role of the press in a free society and with the public's
right to information.
Further, I argue that the Supreme Court wrongly decided Gen-
tile and that only if strict scrutiny review, or its functional
equivalent, the clear and present danger doctrine, is satisfied can
such standing orders limiting attorney speech, and consequently
the newsgathering process, be justified. It would follow that the
standards for restraining lawyer free speech that are more leni-
ent than the substantial likelihood test sanctioned in Gentile, e.g.,
the "reasonable likelihood" of prejudice standard, should be held
unconstitutional. Neither the "substantial likelihood" test nor the
"reasonable likelihood" test is sufficiently narrowly tailored; nei-
ther requires a trial court to make specific record findings that al-
ternative means of avoiding harm would be ineffective.
Finally, I argue that, even if the substantial likelihood test or
reasonable likelihood test is constitutionally adequate to justify
standing rules, they are not constitutionally sufficient standards
for review of judicial gag orders. The prior restraint doctrine is
especially relevant to judicial gag orders on trial participants, in-
cluding lawyers. I also argue that the media should be able to
challenge such gag orders either as a prior restraint on trial par-
ticipants or on the newsgathering process itself. Although I am
unwilling to go as far as Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, who ar-
gues that the actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sulli-
van21 should be used in reviewing restraints on lawyer free
18. United States v. McVeigh, 1997 WL 202537, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 16, 1997) (No. 96-
CR-68-M) (order prohibiting out of court comments); see also infra text accompanying
notes 337-42 (discussing Judge Matsch's implementation of the gag order and his decision
to uphold it when challenged).
19. See infra Part II.D.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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speech,22 I do believe that stringent standards of judicial scrutiny
must be used in reviewing any content-based restraints on the
freedom of lawyer's speech and on the media's right to gather the
news. I argue that the utilitarian rationale employed by the
Court for using strict scrutiny or its equivalent in reviewing clo-
sure of judicial proceedings supports similar treatment of re-
straints on the free speech of lawyers and other trial participants.
Most articles on lawyer free speech, in the context of free press-
fair trial issues, primarily stress the First Amendment rights of
the speaker or the constitutional rights of the defendant. I con-
sider the effect of standing rules and gag orders not only on rights
of the participant-speaker and the parties, but on the news-
gathering process itself and ultimately on the First Amendment
right of the public to receive information. It is the combination of
these public and personal interests that makes anything less
than strict scrutiny constitutionally inadequate.
In Part Two, I address the role of a free press in a free society,
especially the dependence of the public on the press for informa-
tion. I examine the different judicial treatment of restraints on
publication and on newsgathering, discuss the recognition of a
First Amendment-based right of public and press access to judi-
cial proceedings, and discuss the difference between standing
rules and judicial gag orders. In Part Three, I focus on the nature
of standing disciplinary rules regulating out-of-court lawyer
speech, what I believe to be the flawed analysis of the Supreme
Court in Gentile on the constitutional standards required for
standing rules on lawyer extrajudicial speech, and the constitu-
tionality of disciplinary rules using a "reasonable likelihood"
standard. In Part Four, I examine the applicability of the prior
restraint doctrine to gag orders on trial participants, especially
lawyers, the ability of the media to challenge such orders, and the
lower court response to gag orders. Finally, in Part Five, I con-
clude with the argument for strict scrutiny review of direct re-
straints on lawyer speech and of indirect restraints on newsgath-
ering based on the personal and societal interests implicated.
22. See Ervin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under
the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 861 (1998).
2001] 1113
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1107
II. THE ROLE OF A FREE PRESS IN A FREE SOCIETY
A. The Citizen-Critic in American Democracy
A critical foundation of the role of the press in American society
is the citizen-critic or democratic model of the First Amendment.
Our constitutionalism begins from the premise that political sov-
ereignty resides in the people. 'Ve the People of the United
States" created the Constitution to "secure the Blessings of Lib-
erty to ourselves and our Posterity."23 Government derives its just
powers from the consent of the governed; government officials ex-
ercise those powers as trustees in the public interest. If "We the
People" are to exercise meaningfully that governing role in our
democracy, freedom of expression, especially on matters of public
interest and concern, is a necessity.24 As Alexander Meiklejohn
put it, the "principle of the freedom of speech springs from the ne-
cessities of the program of self-government.... It is a deduction
from the basic American agreement that public issues should be
decided by universal suffrage."25
When we speak of freedom of speech in democratic society, our
focus is generally on the freedom of the speaker to criticize gov-
ernment and public officials. As James Madison stated, in our
system, "the censorial power is in the people over the Govern-
ment, and not in the Government over the people."26 But if the
people are to hold government officials accountable, if speech in
our democracy is to be meaningful, the people must be informed.2'
Again, Madison provides the essential argument. "A popular
Government, without popular information, or the means of ac-
23. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
24. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282 ("It is as much [the citizen's] duty to criticize as it is
the official's duty to administer.").
25. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT
26-27 (1948), reprinted in ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1965); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) ("'[Slpeech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government.'" (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)));
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
29 (1971); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 202.
26. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794).
27. See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("[Plublic debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason
this Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of
information and ideas as well as the right of free expression.").
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quiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both."28 The First Amendment must encompass not only a right to
express ideas, but also the right of the public to receive informa-
tion.29 Nevertheless, the Court has been reluctant to speak
broadly of a First Amendment "right to know."" Perhaps this re-
luctance reflects an unwillingness to recognize an affirmative
constitutional duty on government to provide information to the
public.31 Although the Court has been unwilling to recognize such
a broad right to know, it has recognized a First Amendment-
based right of the public to receive information and ideas.2 Gov-
ernment may not interfere with the free flow of information in
democratic society without substantial justification.
Where does the "free press" fit into this model of a "free soci-
ety?" While it has been argued that the First Amendment Press
Clause has an independent constitutional significance, estab-
lishing the press as "a fourth institution outside the Govern-
28. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
29. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) ([T]he right to receive ideas is a
necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
press, and political freedom."); see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32 (1978) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Without some protection for the acquisition of information about the op-
eration of public institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the process of self-
governance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its substance.").
30. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (rejecting First Amendment
right to hear foreign lecturer who was denied a visa); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)
("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information.").
31. See LucAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS IN AMJERICA 133-59 (1991); Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an In-
forming Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 517 (1980)
(concluding "that a judicially enforceable right to know would be inconsistent with the
democratic processes envisioned by the Constitution and thus could not be justified by a
[F]irst [Almendment principle whose office is to vindicate those processes."); David M.
O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's "Right to Know," 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
579, 586 (1980) (rejecting a First Amendment right to know).
32. First Nafl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[Tlhe First Amendment
goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit gov-
ernment from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well established that the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.'); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (The right of freedom of speech and press includes.., the
right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry.. . ." (citation omitted)); Lamont
v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305-07 (1965) (rejecting restrictions on the public's right
to receive publications through the mail); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943) ("[The First Amendment] embraces the right to distribute literature and necessar-
ily protects the right to receive it." (citation omitted)); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 250 (1936) (holding unconstitutional a tax on publications because an "informed pub-
lic opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment').
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ment," intended to provide "an additional check on the three offi-
cial branches,"33 this is not the press model that has been ac-
cepted. Rather, the Press Clause has been treated as a companion
to the Speech Clause, having no independent substantive signifi-
cance.34 Instead of being able to claim constitutional rights and
privileges on its own, the press claims First Amendment rights as
the agent or surrogate of the public.35
Even if rejection of the Fourth Branch argument does limit the
constitutional claims that the press may effectively pursue, it
does not diminish the vital role the press plays in making the
democratic model work. In modern society, it is increasingly diffi-
cult for any citizen or group of citizens to perform the "checking
function" on government. Citizens are unable to obtain the infor-
mation and ideas to evaluate adequately government action and
hold public officials accountable. 6 As Justice Powell stated:
An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by
the news media. ... For most citizens the prospect of personal fa-
miliarity with newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seek-
ing out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at
large. It is the means by which the people receive that free flow of in-
formation and ideas essential to intelligent self-government.
3 7
33. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975); see Vikram
David Amar, From Watergate to Ken Starr: Potter Stewart's "Or of the Press" a Quarter
Century Later, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 712 (1999) ("Constitutional developments of recent
decades have borne out the correctness and centrality of Justice Stewart's first big point-
that the criticism of government is fully protected expression that lies at the heart of the
First Amendment."). See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
34. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 798 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("First, although certainty
on this point is not possible, the history of the Clause does not suggest that the [Framers]
contemplated a 'special' or 'institutional' privilege."); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S.
843 (1974) (rejecting an affirmative First Amendment-based press right of access to pris-
ons or right to interview specific prisoners); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974)
(same). See generally SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 22:1-9; Amar, supra note 33, at 713 n.11
("ITihe Court has thus far failed to afford the Press any special First Amendment protec-
tion since Justice Stewart wrote.").
35. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980) ("Instead of
acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from
those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media.
In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public."); see
Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARv. L. REV.
84, 84 (1998) ("Despite the textual mandate of the Press Clause, cases dealing with press
access and reporters' privileges have rejected the notion that the Press Clause confers on
the press distinct rights not conferred by the Speech Clause on all speakers and all writ-
ers.").
36. See generally Blasi, supra note 33.
37. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Even if citizens do secure accurate information, or simply wish
to question or express opinions contrary to government authority,
the citizen's ability to make herself heard in modern society is se-
verely limited (although the Internet may be changing this). In
Mills v. Alabama," the Court addressed the role of the press in
holding the government accountable and checking abuses of the
public trust: "Thus, the press serves and was designated to serve
as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental
officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping offi-
cials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they
were selected to serve."39
At least, this is the paradigm-the press acting as the "eyes
and ears" of the public and as its watchdog checking abuses of the
public trust.4 ° Of course, the reality often falls far short of the
ideal. While the press often is woefully deficient in performing its
agency role in free, democratic society, the answer is not to make
the press less free or to limit its ability to communicate and
gather information relevant to the citizen-critic. The press is
subject to government regulation in the First Amendment regime
in the public interest, but that regulation must be narrowly tai-
lored and subject to close judicial scrutiny.
B. Restraints on Publication
When people refer to freedom of the press, most are thinking of
the freedom of the media to publish. The struggle against govern-
ment censorship of publication was the crucible in which our con-
ception of freedom of speech and press was forged.4' Even today,
prior restraints are highly suspect, both substantively and proce-
durally; they are presumptively unconstitutional.42 Government
38. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
39. Id. at 219.
40. Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) ("Beyond question, the role of the
media is important; acting as the 'eyes and ears' of the public, they can be a powerful and
constructive force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public business. They
have served that function since the beginning of the Republic, but like all other compo-
nents of our society media representatives are subject to limits.").
41. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) ("In determining the
extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered
that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publica-
tion.").
42. See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). The New York Times
Court stated that -[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
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bears a "heavy burden of showing justification" when it employs
this form of regulation."
Similarly, government efforts to dictate what the press may
and may not publish are severely limited.' When government
undertakes to regulate protected speech based on its content,
whether it regulates based on the viewpoint of the publication or
its subject matter, the regulation usually is presumptively inva-
lid." Regulation based on some harm believed to be caused by the
communication is subject to strict scrutiny review, i.e., the gov-
ernment must establish that it is necessary for a compelling state
interest. 6 There must be no less restrictive alternative. 7 "[Albove
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.'" Id. (quoting Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). The Court went on to explain that "[tihe
Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of
such a restraint.'" Id. (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
See generally SMOLLA, supra note 2, at ch. 15; ZUCKMAN, supra note 2, at 83-91.
43. N.Y Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
44. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of
'individual freedom of mind.'") (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943));
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (invalidating a Florida stat-
ute affording a right of reply to personal attacks on political candidates by newspapers).
45. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("[Tlhe First Amendment,
subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmen-
tal control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals."); R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations are presumptively inva-
lid."); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991)
("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a finan-
cial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.").
46. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (2000) ("Since
[the challenged law] is a content-based speech restriction, it can stand only if it satisfies
strict scrutiny. If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tai-
lored to promote a compelling Government interest.... To do otherwise would be to re-
strict speech without an adequate justification, a course the First Amendment does not
permit.") (citations omitted); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (holding that "the
[Communications Decency Act] is a content-based blanket restriction on speech" subject to
the "most stringent review"); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (requiring "the most ex-
acting scrutiny"); Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 117, 118 (requiring a showing that
the challenged regulation "establish[ing] a financial disincentive to create or publish
works with a particular content" serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to that interest); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1987) (holding that a provision of the
District of Columbia Code prohibiting the display of any sign critical of a foreign govern-
ment within 500 feet of its embassy to be a content-based restriction on speech that "must
be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny"); Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481
U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (stating that a state content-based tax regulation must serve a com-
pelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that end in order to satisfy
the First Amendment).
47. Playboy, 120 S. Ct. at 1886 ("If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Gov-
ernment's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative."); Reno, 521 U.S. at 879
("The breadth of this content-based restriction on speech imposes an especially heavy bur-
den on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective
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all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content."48
1. Prior Restraint
Judicial gag orders based on content generally are treated as
prior restraints.49 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart"0 is a classic ex-
ample of the rigorous scrutiny applied to such restraining orders
even in the free press-fair trial context. Many trial judges had
read the Court's opinion in Sheppard v. Maxwell51 as authorizing
them to use their discretion to protect defendants by restraining
press publication. In Nebraska Press, however, Chief Justice Bur-
ger, writing for a unanimous Court, overturned even the modified
gag order on press publication.52 He described such a prior re-
straint as "one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our
jurisprudence"53 and as "the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights."54 Since a free press is
critical to proper judicial administration, "the protection against
prior restraint should have particular force as applied to report-
ing of criminal proceedings .... , 5
The presumption against prior restraint can be overcome, the
Court held, only if there is a clear and present danger of preju-
as the [Communications Decency Act].").
48. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
49. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down a ju-
dicial order that had perpetually enjoined the publication of a scurrilous publication as a
prior restraint and establishing the presumption against prior restraints); see also N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that the Executive had
failed to meet the heavy burden of justification necessary to enjoin newspapers from pub-
lishing classified materials concerning the Vietnam War). Judicial gag orders that are con-
tent-neutral, on the other hand, receive only a form of intermediate review. See Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 767 (1994) (holding that speech-free buffer zones
around abortion clinics are constitutional after applying a somewhat-less-than-strict-
scrutiny standard, i.e., burdening no more speech than necessary to serve a significant
government interest); see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Netvork, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (ap-
plying the Madsen standard to strike down floating buffer zones and uphold fixed buffer
zones).
50. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
51. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See generally Symposium, Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 29
STAN. L. REV. 383 (1977).
52. Neb. Press, 427 U.S. at 540, 570.
53. Id. at 562.
54. Id. at 559.
55. Id.
2001] 1119
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1107
dice.56 More particularly, before issuing the restraining order, the
trial judge must conduct a hearing and make on-the-record find-
ings based on the evidence on three issues: "(a) the nature and ex-
tent of pre-trial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would
be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity;
and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to pre-
vent the threatened danger.""7 The potential for prejudice is al-
ways speculative and the efficacy of a gag order is always ques-
tionable. 8 Most importantly, the availability of less restrictive
alternatives, especially a searching voir dire, makes the requisite
showing practically impossible.59
Although Nebraska Press did not adopt a per se rule invali-
dating all gag orders on the media, it did erect a near-absolute
rule of invalidity. While trial courts continue occasionally to issue
such orders, they are regularly reversed on appeal." For example,
the Sixth Circuit in Procter & Gamble v. Bankers Trust Co.6 re-
versed an ex parte restraining order that barred Business Week
from publishing material under a protective order.62 Calling this a
"patently invalid" order which "should never have been entered,"
the appellate court stressed that it had not been shown that pub-
lication would pose any "grave threat to a critical government in-
terest or to a constitutional right .... ."' Even a temporary order
to preserve the status quo, the court said, must clear a substan-
tial hurdle: "publication must threaten an interest more funda-
mental than the First Amendment itself."64
56. Id. at 562.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 565.
59. See id. at 563-64.
60. See generally DIENES, supra note 1, at 33 n.98; SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 15.32. But
see United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla.) [hereinafter "Noriega F], affd,
917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) [hereinafter "Noriega II"], cert denied sub nom.
CNN, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990). In Noriega I, the district court issued a tempo-
rary restraining order on broadcast of tapes of conversations between Panamanian dicta-
tor Manuel Noriega, charged with violation of drug laws, and his attorneys and required
submission of the tapes for in camera review. See Noriega I, 752 F. Supp. at 1036. The ap-
pellate court affirmed. See Noriega II, 917 F.2d at 1552. In subsequent proceedings, CNN
was found guilty of criminal contempt for its violation of the restraining order. See United
States v. CNN, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1549, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1994). For a discussion on Noriega,
see generally DIENES, supra note 1, at 31-33; RODNEY A. SMoLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN
OPEN SOCIETY ch. 9 (1992); SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 15:37-15:40. See also In re State Rec-
ord Co., 504 S.E.2d 592 (S.C. 1998) (upholding gag order on television studio's broadcast of
a videotaped, privileged communication between a murder defendant and his attorney).
61. 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
62. Id. at 221.
63. Id. at 225.
64. Id. at 227.
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There are still aberrations where a gag order on the media sur-
vives even the exacting scrutiny mandated by Nebraska Press. In
such cases, the collateral bar doctrine, which requires obedience
to a non-frivolous judicial order pending expedited review, con-
tinues to pose a significant obstacle to media publication.65 Never-
theless, the presumptive invalidity of a content-based prior re-
straint and the demanding standard of constitutional review that
is used are significant obstacles to the use of judicial gag orders.
The question remains whether courts will apply Nebraska Press
and the prior restraint doctrine to gag orders imposed on trial
participants, including attorneys, especially when only the non-
party press challenges the restraint.
2. Sanctions Based on Publication
Freedom of the media to publish is not limited to freedom from
administrative or judicial censorship. When the government im-
poses sanctions based on the content of the publication, the
regulation is presumptively invalid.66 For example, in the free
press-fair trial context, contempt citations against the press for
prejudicial publication are unconstitutional unless the publica-
tion is shown to create a clear and present danger to the admini-
stration of justice.6" The severity of this First Amendment review
is such that contempt sanctions are regularly invalidated and
seldom used. Similarly, imposition of civil or criminal sanctions
65. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding convictions for
violating a court order forbidding a civil rights march without a permit and disallowing a
First Amendment defense to the validity of the order); In re Providence Journal Co., 820
F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on reh'g en banc, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
an order prohibiting publication of information obtained through a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act request to the FBI to be transparently invalid). In the en banc proceeding, the
First Circuit held that a publisher who is subject to a transparently unconstitutional prior
restraint must make a good faith effort to seek emergency relief from an appellate court
before publishing. Providence, 820 F.2d at 1355.
66. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (discussing regulation of indecent
speech on the Internet); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530-33 (1989) (involving publica-
tion of names of rape victims); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (dis-
cussing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims brought by public figures); Smith
v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1979) (involving publication of names of ju-
venile homicide suspects); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (dis-
cussing defamation claims based on reporting on the official activities of a public official).
See generally SMOLLA, supra note 2, at chs. 3 & 4.
67. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); see also Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 384 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 372 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 334 (1946).
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on the media for publishing truthful information of public signifi-
cance that the media has lawfully obtained has been held uncon-
stitutional.6"
An excellent example of the presumptive invalidity of content-
based sanctions on press publication is the "Son of Sam" decision,
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board.69
The Court unanimously held unconstitutional a law requiring
that income received by an accused or convicted criminal result-
ing from publications dealing with his crime be deposited in a vic-
tims' compensation fund.7 ° The Court held that the law was con-
tent-based because it discriminated between income derived from
speech (publication) and other income from the crime and dis-
criminated against speech involving a particular subject matter,
i.e., speech about crime.7' Invoking the presumption of invalidity,
the Court held that the state had failed to satisfy strict scrutiny.72
Although the "Son of Sam" law served compelling interests in
compensating crime victims and preventing criminals from prof-
iting from crime, it was not narrowly tailored.73 It was "signifi-
cantly overinclusive," covering numerous valuable works dealing
with the author's thoughts and recollections, regardless of
whether the state's interests would be served.74 The government
could pursue its interests using less restrictive means.75
During the O.J. Simpson criminal litigation, California sought
68. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 539, 541 (holding that the First Amendment prevents
using a rape shield statute to establish negligence per se against a newspaper for pub-
lishing the name of a rape victim after it obtained the information from a publicly released
police report); Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. at 103-04 (striking down a statute allowing
prosecution of newspapers for publishing the name of a juvenile homicide suspect); Land-
mark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 840 (1978) (holding that a newspa-
per may not be prosecuted for publishing truthful information about the proceedings of a
confidential judicial review commission); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310
(1977) (reversing an injunction on the publication of a juvenile defendant's name and pic-
ture obtained from an open hearing of juvenile court); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 491 (1975) (rejecting civil liability for the publication of a rape victim's name when
the name was obtained from publicly available government records).
69. 502 U.S. 105 (1991). The presumptive invalidity of content-based regulation is not
limited to print publication. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 120 S.
Ct. 1878 (2000) (cable); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (Internet); Sable Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (dial-a-porn). But it does not apply to broadcasting.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
70. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
71. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116.
72. Id. at 115-16, 123.
73. Id. at 118-19, 123.
74. Id. at 121.
75. See id. at 123.
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to curb "checkbook journalism" by banning press payments to ju-
rors for their stories76 and by prohibiting payments to prospective
witnesses for selling their information to the press.77 Citing
Simon & Schuster, Inc. and using strict scrutiny review, the
courts held both laws unconstitutional as content-based regula-
tions on speech.7' Even though the laws did not discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint and furthered the compelling interest in
the integrity of the criminal justice system, the state failed to
overcome the First Amendment presumption of invalidity. Simply
put, the laws were not narrowly tailored but were instead overly
broad intrusions on the press's right to publish.79
When government regulation of speech is content-neutral,
courts use a less demanding form of judicial balancing." Usually
this involves some form of "intermediate review" such as that
formulated in United States v. O'Brien:8' "[A] government regula-
tion is sufficiently justified... if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial government interest; if the government interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction of alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."2 While the
O'Brien test might be read to adopt a less restrictive means test,
the Court has rejected such an interpretation. Rather, the stan-
dard is satisfied if the challenged regulation directly and effec-
tively furthers the government interest.83 In practice, this inter-
mediate form of judicial review is often extremely deferential.8 4
A court often will use this intermediate form of scrutiny when
76. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 116.5 (West 1999).
77. See id. § 132.5 (West 1999); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1669.7 (West 1999).
78. Dove Audio, Inc. v. Lungren, No. CV 95-2570 RG (JRX), 1995 WL 432631, at *2
(C.D. Cal. June 14, 1995) (striking down CAL. PENAL CODE § 116.5 (enacted 1994)); Cal.
First Amendment Coalition v. Lungren, No. C 95-0440-FMS, 1995 WL 482066, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 10, 1995) (permanently enjoining enforcement of CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5 (en-
acted 1994) and CAL. CIV. CODE § 1669.7 (enacted 1994)).
79. See Dove Audio, Inc., 1995 WL 432631, at *5; Cal. First Amendment Coalition,
1995 WL 482066, at *8.
80. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 2, at ch. 9.
81. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). For examples of intermediate review in press cases, see
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) and Turner Broadcasting System
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
82. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
83. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-802 (1989).
84. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv. L.
REV. 1175, 1180 (1996); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L.
REV. 46, 50-52 (1987).
112320011
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1107
it determines that the burden of a regulation on speech is only in-
cidental rather than direct. If the government justifies its regula-
tion without reference to speech content, e.g., because of "secon-
dary effects" of the speech, the courts may label it content-neutral
and invoke intermediate review.85 As I discuss below, the "sub-
stantial likelihood" test sanctioned in Gentile often is treated as a
form of intermediate review.86
Then there are some contexts, usually when government is
managing the forum or financing the speech rather than regu-
lating it, in which the courts abandon the above models. In re-
viewing restraints on freedom of expression in the military, pris-
ons, schools, broadcasting, public subsidies, and nonpublic
forums, courts often approve even content-based regulations with
little more than an ad hoc balancing test. This is often simply a
general requirement of reasonableness or an even more deferen-
tial rationality test.87
For example, consider the judicial treatment of restraints on
the speech of government employees. When the government acts
as employer rather than as regulator of the marketplace of ideas,
courts abandon the usual rule of presumptive invalidity of con-
tent-based restraints. If the employee is able to prove that she
was disciplined because of her expressive activity, then the courts
apply an ad hoc interest balancing test formulated in Pickering v.
Board of Education.8" Even this less speech-protective balancing
test is used only if the speech involves matters of public rather
than private concern.89 Can the lawyer as an officer of the court
be analogized to a government employee?
Standing rules on attorney extrajudicial speech limit speech on
the basis of content. The Court in Gentile, however, did not treat
the restrictions as presumptively invalid; strict scrutiny was not
85. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (upholding
zoning ordinance that limited the permissible locations of adult motion picture theaters).
86. See infra notes 172-91 and accompanying text (discussing Gentile and the test that
the Court applied).
87. See generally DIENES, supra note 1, at 3-4; C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the
Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109 (1986);
C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other
"Special Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779 (1988); C. Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret
Connolly, When Students Speak: Judicial Review in the Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L.
& POLY REV. 343 (1989).
88. 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1995).
89. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1998); Ran-
kin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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constitutionally required. I will consider below whether any of the
above exceptions justify this departure."
C. Restraints on Newsgathering
There is little question today that the First Amendment pro-
tects newsgathering. Even as the Court in Branzburg v. Hayes9
formally rejected a First Amendment-based journalist's privilege,
it stated: "Nor is it suggested that newsgathering does not qualify
for First Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 2
Justice Stewart, dissenting, was similarly emphatic: "News must
not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to
acquire informaation the right to publish would be impermissibly
compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of some dimen-
sions, must exist."93 The lower court progeny of Branzburg recog-
nizing a First Amendment-based journalist's privilege attests to
the fact that newsgathering is constitutionally protected.94
But newsgathering generally is not as protected as publish-
ing.95 Restraints on newsgathering are treated as incidental bur-
90. See infra Part II.
91. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
92. Id. at 681.
93. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94. See generally DIENES, supra note 1, at 837-928 and cases cited therein.
95. Compare Randall P. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Be-
tween Exemption and Independence in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMORY L.J. 895,
897 (1998) (arguing that press freedom "consists of independence in publication judg-
ments, not privilege to engage in conduct" and therefore that the press bears "a heavy
burden of proof to justify an exception or exemption" from generally applicable laws), with
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding Ag-
gressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 1143, 1144-45 (2000) (arguing that media li-
ability for violation of generally applicable laws should be imposed only if they survive in-
termediate scrutiny-that is, only if application of the law "is proven to be substantially
related to achieve an important government purpose."), C. Thomas Dienes, Protecting In-
vestigative Journalism, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1139, 1141, 1151 (1999) (arguing for a
First Amendment-based privilege or defense for certain intrusion contexts and for limiting
damages for newsgathering torts to those caused by the newsgathering itself, barring re-
covery of consequential damages from publication), Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a
Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That Bar First Amendment Protection for News-
gathering, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135, 1139 (1997) (arguing that liability for newsgathering
torts should be based on a standard similar to actual malice such as "bad faith" or "outra-
geous conduct."), and David A. Logan, Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Sur-
reptitious Newsgathering, 83 IOWA L. REV. 161, 164 (1997) (supporting a common law tort
principle-based regime to limit the size of awards to victims of tortious newsgathering "to
avoid creating excessive disincentives to engage in investigative reporting").
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dens on freedom of speech.9 6 Justice Brennan explained the di-
chotomy in terms of two models of the First Amendment. The free
speech model posits that "the primary purpose of the First
Amendment is more or less absolutely to prohibit any interfer-
ence with freedom of expression."97 Government burdens on
speech and publication are subject to close judicial scrutiny. Un-
der the structural model, the press engages in activities designed
to promote effective public discussion; it performs "communica-
tive functions required by our democratic beliefs."" This model,
applicable to newsgathering, requires that courts balance the ef-
fects of a regulation on the informing and checking role of the
media against the social values the regulation serves. A less
speech-protective standard of judicial review is used to evaluate
restraints on newsgathering.
Whatever the merits of Justice Brennan's theoretical construct,
the courts generally have not accorded newsgathering as much
constitutional protection as publication.99 Thus, the Supreme
Court has indicated repeatedly that the press is subject to gener-
ally applicable laws that incidentally, albeit significantly, burden
the media's newsgathering function.00 And yet, even as the
96. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (Brennan,
J.) (recognizing a presumptive right of access to criminal trials and applying strict scru-
tiny to their closure: "The First Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those
rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment,
are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights."); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding
that the First Amendment guarantees the public's and the press's right of access to crimi-
nal trials in order to foster informed debate on public issues: "[Tihe First Amendment em-
bodies more than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange for
their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government."); William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Dedication of the S.I.
Newhouse Center for Law and Justice (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERs L. REV. 173, 175-82
(1979). See generally DIENES, supra note 1, at 14-15, 45-46 (discussing Justice Brennan's
structuralist approach).
97. Brennan, supra note 96, at 176.
98. Id. at 177.
99. See supra note 96.
100. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (upholding a promissory
estoppel claim and citing a "well-established line of decisions holding that generally appli-
cable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."). Likewise, in
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), the Court held that there is no First
Amendment restriction on searches of newsrooms but that the courts should apply "war-
rant requirements with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be
endangered by the search." Id. at 565. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), the Court held that the press has no special
protection from generally applicable antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 380-81, 391. The
Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), held that reporters have no First
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courts reject any First Amendment defenses or privileges to tort
and contract liability for newsgathering activities,'' judges do in-
voke First Amendment concerns in applying legal standards to
the facts. First Amendment considerations are employed in an
episodic, uncertain form of balancing analysis.' 2
In a number of decisions fashioning a First Amendment right
of public access to judicial proceedings, the courts have employed
standards of judicial review that approximate strict scrutiny even
though it is newsgathering that is burdened.' 3 Thus, in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, °4 which invalidated a state
statute requiring the closing of the courtroom to the press and
public during the testimony of minor victims of designated sexual
Amendment privilege to refuse to disclose confidential information to grand juries. Id. at
690-91. Similarly, in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the Court held
that the press has no special protection from generally applicable antitrust laws. Id. at 7.
Finally, in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), the Court held that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act applies to the press:
The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application
of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties
of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of
court. He is subject to the anti-trust laws. Like others he must pay equitable
and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business.
Id. at 132-33 (citations omitted).
101. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the
First Amendment did not bar an action for invasion of privacy where defendant's employ-
ees gained access to plaintiffs home by subterfuge and, without his consent, photographed
him, recorded their conversation, and transmitted it to third parties); Food Lion, Inc. v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 822 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that there was
no First Amendment defense to, inter alia, trespass and fraud claims stemming from un-
dercover reporting of unsanitary food handling practices); Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d
67, 77 (Cal. 1999) (declining to consider constitutional defenses because they were not pre-
sented for review, while holding that "a person who lacks a reasonable expectation of com-
plete privacy in a conversation, because it could be seen and overheard by coworkers (but
not the general public), may nevertheless have a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion
based on a television reporter's covert videotaping of that conversation."); Shulman v.
Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 477 (Cal. 1998) (holding that there was no First
Amendment defense to an intrusion claim based upon the filming of an accident victim
receiving medical care in a rescue helicopter); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614
(1999) (holding that law enforcement officer's act of bringing reporters into a home while
attempting execution of a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment).
102. See Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1365 (7th Cir. 1995) (considering First
Amendment values in dismissing trespass and intrusion claims stemming from under-
cover reporting that occurred in the publicly accessible areas of a business); PETA v.
Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1278-79 (Nev. 1995) (holding that, in determining
whether conduct is actionable as intrusion, the court must consider the facts and circum-
stances of the conduct and the reasonable privacy expectations of the plaintiff); Jerome A.
Barron, Cohen v. Cowles Media and Its Significance for First Amendment Law and Jour-
nalism, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 419, 463 (1994) ("Cohen was a press case where First
Amendment Rights were in conflict."); Dienes, supra note 95, at 1149-51.
103. See DIENES, supra note 1, § 2-2; SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 25:1.
104. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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offenses, the Court recognized a presumptive right of access. °5
Justice Brennan, for the Court, asked whether the mandatory
closure rule "is necessitated by a compelling governmental inter-
est, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."' 6 While the
dissent applied a deferential balancing analysis, °7 the Court
struck down the state rule because the mandatory closure law
was not narrowly tailored.'
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ("Press-Enterprise
ii",),0 9 the Court extended the presumptive right of public access
from criminal trials to pretrial proceedings. The California Su-
preme Court had held that a trial court could close a preliminary
hearing if it was established that there existed a "'reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice.""'" But the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that closure was constitutionally permissible only
if "specific, on the record findings [were] made demonstrating
that 'closure is essential to preserve higher values and is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest."'" When it is concern over
prejudice to a defendant's fair trial rights that motivates closure,
the Court continued, the trial judge must find "first, [that] there
is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair
trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent,
and, second, [that] reasonable alternatives to closure cannot ade-
quately protect the defendant's fair trial rights.""2 Thus, the
Court rejected the dissent's argument that only a generalized
balancing test should be used in reviewing closure orders."'
Of special importance to the subject of restraints on attorney
free speech, the Court rejected the "reasonable likelihood" test be-
cause it imposes "a lesser burden on the defendant than the 'sub-
stantial probability' test which ... is called for by the First
Amendment."" 4 The Court stressed that, in applying the narrow
tailoring standard, the trial court had failed to consider whether
105. Id. at 610-11.
106. Id. at 606-07.
107. See id. at 616 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 609.
109. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 13-14 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984) [hereinafter "Press-Enterprise I"]).





reasonable alternatives to closure could protect the defendant's
fair trial rights."5 This demand for consideration of less restric-
tive means is the essence of strict scrutiny, which I argue is the
constitutionally correct standard for reviewing restraints on at-
torney free speech.
In fashioning the presumptive right of public access, the Court
focused on two considerations--"whether the place and process
have historically been open to the press and general public," and
"whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question.""6 While the ex-
perience that history provides is important in developing the
public access right, it is the functional value of access that prop-
erly has proven critical. Furthermore, it is not simply the value of
openness to the particular proceeding but to self government and
to citizenship that has provided, and should provide, the focus for
the developing First Amendment right.
Consider the analysis of the value of openness developed in the
watershed case, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,"' in
which the Court initially established the public's and press's right
of access to criminal trials. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, concluded that such an access right is implicit in the First
Amendment: "The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to
publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much
meaning if access to observe the trial could... be foreclosed arbi-
trarily."118
Justice Brennan, concurring, focused on the importance of
public and press access "in securing and fostering our republican
system of government"--the structural role of the First Amend-
ment." 9 To provide some limiting principles to this structural
analysis, he urged consideration of tradition and function. 20
Openness of the criminal trial, he argued, assists in "a fair and
accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence;"' it informs the citi-
zenry to assure "that procedural rights are respected, and that
115. Id.
116. Id. at 8.
117. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
118. Id. at 576-77.
119. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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justice is afforded equally;"'22 it provides "an important check,
akin in purpose to other checks and balances that infuse our sys-
tem of government;" 12 3 and "[p]ublicizing trial proceedings aids
accurate factfinding."12 4 Similar functional analyses as the basis
for heightened First Amendment scrutiny of closure orders lim-
iting public and press access rights (and newsgathering) pervade
the Supreme Court and lower court access jurisprudence.
Recently, the California Supreme Court extended the First
Amendment-based right of public access to civil trials. In NBC
Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court,'25 the court
stressed that the public has an interest, in all civil cases, in ob-
serving and assessing the performance of its public judicial sys-
tem, and that interest strongly supports a general right of access
in ordinary civil cases."'26 The same "utilitarian values" identified
by Justice Brennan and invoked by the lower courts in support of
the access right in criminal trials applied with equal force in or-
dinary civil trials and proceedings.'27
[U]nder the case law described above, public access plays an impor-
tant and specific structural role in the conduct of such proceedings.
Public access to civil proceedings serves to (i) demonstrate that jus-
tice is meted out fairly, thereby promoting public confidence in such
governmental proceedings; (ii) provide a means by which citizens
scrutinize and check the use and possible abuse of judicial power;
and (iii) enhance the truthfinding function of the proceeding.
The California court acknowledged the role of the press in im-
plementing these utilitarian values. To secure the First Amend-
ment-based access right, the court invoked the constitutional rule
of presumptive openness and the stringent constitutional stan-
dard of review that the Supreme Court fashioned in Press-
Enterprise I.1 29
I argue that courts should apply functional considerations
similar to those that have driven the development of the public
and press access right when government undertakes to gag or
122. Id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring).
124. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. 980 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1999).
126. Id. at 360.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 366.
129. See id. at 361.
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otherwise restrain the free speech rights of lawyers and other
trial participants and thereby burdens the structural role of a
free press in its newsgathering activities. As in the public access
cases, government should not be allowed to gag or otherwise re-
strain speech of public interest and concern without record find-
ings establishing, first, that the restraint is narrowly tailored to
serve overriding public concerns and, second, that no less burden-
some alternatives to such restraint are reasonably available. 3 °
D. Restraining the Speech of Trial Participants
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,'3' the Supreme Court stated:
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will pro-
tect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither
prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff
nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court
should be permitted to frustrate its function.
132
The Court did not identify, however, when the threat of prejudice
is sufficiently serious as to justify suppression of the speech of
these trial participants.'
130. See infra Part V (discussing the need for strict scrutiny).
131. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
132. Id. at 363. See generally DIENEs, supra note 1, at ch. 7; SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§
15:41-15:52; Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights, Too: Why Gag Orders on
Trial Participants Are Almost Always Unconstitutional, 17 LoY L.A. ENT. L. REV. 311
(1997); Chemerinsky, supra note 22; Symposium, The Sound of Silence: Reflections on the
Use of the Gag Order, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 305 (1997); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Speaking
out Outside the Courtroom, 47 EMORY L.J. 889 (1998); Katrina M. Kelly, Comment, The
"Impartial" Jury and Media Overload: Rethinking Attorney Speech Regulations in the
1990s, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483 (1996); Eileen A. Minnefor, Note, Looking for Fair Trials
in the Information Age: The Need for More Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Partici-
pants, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 95 (1995); Stabile, supra note 2; Swartz, supra note 11; Ren6 L.
Todd, Note, Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial Response to Media Chal-
lenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial Participants, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1171 (1990); Loretta
S. Yuan, Comment, Gag Orders and the Ultimate Sanction, 18 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 629
(1998).
133. The Sheppard trial was permeated with a "carnival atmosphere," Sheppard, 384
U.S. at 358, and "bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took
over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, espe-
cially Sheppard." Id. at 355. Sheppard was subjected to massive and pervasive publicity
before and during the trial, and most of the putative evidence was never admitted at trial.
Id. at 353, 356-57. The trial judge denied a change of venue and merely suggested to the
jurors that they try to avoid outside influences. Id. at 355. The jurors were finally seques-
tered when the case was submitted to them, but they still had uncontrolled access to tele-
phones. Id. at 352-53. Sheppard was convicted of second-degree murder in the bludgeoning
death of his pregnant wife. Id. at 335.
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As indicated above, there are two primary methods by which
trial courts can restrain the speech of trial participants and
thereby limit potentially harmful media publicity. First, trial
courts, acting on a case-by-case basis, can impose restrictive (gag)
orders on some or all trial participants. Second, standing rules
can be adopted to define the limits of permissible extrajudicial
commentary by the lawyers involved.
While courts often use standing rules in fashioning gag orders
to restrain trial participants, especially lawyers, it is important to
distinguish the two forms of regulations. Standing rules are
adopted under the authority of the court, but it is only the gag or-
der that traditionally is denominated as a "prior restraint." The
gag order directly restrains the parties to particular litigation be-
fore the court who are identified in the order from speaking about
all or certain aspects of the case. There is no preexisting standard
governing the scope of the order regarding either the parties re-
strained or the subject matter of the restraint. If the gag order is
violated, the court imposes contempt sanctions. On the other
hand, a standing disciplinary rule binds the parties identified in
the rule independent of any particular litigation. The rule is more
like a statute prohibiting certain kinds of publications, e.g., the
names of rape victims. Whereas the collateral bar doctrine pro-
hibits violation of a gag order pending appeal, the standing rule is
subject to constitutional attack when it is enforced.
On the other hand, the two forms of restraints are similar in
many respects.'34 Both forms of restraint are enforced by sanc-
tions imposed after a violation occurs. The panoply of criminal
procedural safeguards is not necessarily available. The purpose
and effect of both forms of control is to restrain extrajudicial
speech. The Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer35 declined to invoke the "'heavy presumption' of invalidity
applicable to prior restraints in reviewing the constitutionality of
local standing rules, 3 ' but it did subject the disciplinary rules to
134. On the similarities and distinctions between gag orders and standing rules, see
Douglas E. Mirell, Gag Orders & Attorney Discipline Rules: Why Not Base the Former
upon the Latter?, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 353, 363-67 (1997) (contrasting the purposes
for the existence of, and sanctions for the violation of, gag attorney disciplinary rules on
trial publicity); Yuan, supra note 132, at 635-36 (discussing similarities and differences
between gag orders and standing rules and emphasizing the differences in methods avail-
able to challenge each type of restraint).
135. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
136. Id. at 249.
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"even closer scrutiny than a legislative restriction."" 7 The appel-
late court explained: "[Wie cannot label the no-comment rules as
'prior restraints' given the connotations of that term, but we do
recognize that these rules have some of the inherent features of
'prior restraints' which have caused the judiciary to review them
with particular care." 38
The focus of Part Three is on standing disciplinary rules. In
Part Four, I focus on judicial gag orders.
III. STANDING DISCIPLINARY RULES
A. The Form of the Standing Rules
In Sheppard, the Court declared that "[c]ollaboration between
counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a
criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly cen-
surable and worthy of disciplinary measures."'39 In 1968, the
American Bar Association ("ABA") responded to Sheppard and to
the report of the Warren Commission on the need for ethical
standards to prevent publicity that threatens to interfere with
the administration of justice by recommending Disciplinary Rule
7-107.4° The Rule prohibited pretrial commentary and barred
out-of-court statements during trial "reasonably likely to interfere
with a fair trial."'4 ' A majority of state and federal courts subse-
quently adopted local rules incorporating the "reasonable likeli-
hood" test.'
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,143 decided in 1975,
however, the Seventh Circuit held that the reasonable likelihood
test incorporated in local rules, while not a prior restraint, was
unconstitutionally overbroad.'4 The appellate court stated: "Only
those comments that pose a 'serious and imminent threat' of in-
terference with the fair administration of justice can be constitu-
137. Id.
138. Id. at 248-49.
139. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
140. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1067-68 (1991) (discussing MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILIY DR 7-107 (1969)).
141. MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBiITY DR 7-107[D] (1969).
142. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1067-68.
143. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
144. Id. at 249.
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tionally proscribed."'45 One year later, the Supreme Court in Ne-
braska Press Association v. Stuart146 used the prior restraint doc-
trine and the clear and present danger doctrine to hold gag orders
on the media unconstitutional.14 While the Court and Justice
Brennan, concurring, distinguished and endorsed restraints on
trial attorneys, 4 1 this was dicta and the Justices did not provide
reasons. In any case, in 1978, the ABA, recommending adoption
of the "clear and present danger" test, amended its Standards for
Criminal Justice.
149
Then, in 1983, the ABA drafted the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules was divided into three sec-
tions. 50 The first prohibits extrajudicial statements that "a law-
yer knows or reasonably should know" will have a "substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceed-
ing."'51 The second part of Rule 3.6 identifies statements likely to
violate this test.152 The third part provides a "safe harbor," identi-
fying various kinds of statements that, if made without elabora-
tion, would not violate the ethical standards.'53 This method of
identifying statements that will presumptively violate the rules
and those that will be "safe" is common to standing disciplinary
rules.
By 1991, when Gentile was decided, thirty-two states had
adopted local standing rules based on Rule 3.6."' Eleven states
continued to follow the "reasonable likelihood" test.155 Five states
and the District of Columbia used the clear and present danger
doctrine or its equivalent.'56 It should be noted that, even today,
the overwhelming majority of federal district courts employ the
deferential reasonable likelihood standard.'57
145. Id.
146. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
147. See id. at 556-62.
148. See id. at 552-54; id. at 601 (Brennan, J., concurring).
149. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD 8-1.1 (1978).
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (1992). See generally Joel H. Swift,
Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 64
B.U. L. REV. 1003 (1984); Gabriel G. Gregg, Comment, ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule
5-120: A Flawed Approach to the Problem of Trial Publicity, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1321 (1996).
151. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (1992).
152. Id. R. 3.6(b).
153. Id. R. 3.6(c).
154. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1068 (1991).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 15:46 n.13.
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B. Gentile v. State Bar
Although the Seventh Circuit in Bauer had held that the "seri-
ous and imminent threat" test was constitutionally mandated for
imposition of disciplinary rules, 5 ' the Fourth Circuit in Hirsch-
kop v. Snead'59 rejected the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and
holding. 6 ° Hirschkop held that the "reasonable likelihood" stan-
dard was constitutional.' 6' The local disciplinary rule furthered
the "substantial interest in assuring every person the right to a
fair trial" and was "'no greater than is necessary or essential" to
protecting that interest.'62 Less intrusive means of assuring the
fair trial right were summarily dismissed as "inadequate,"63 even
though this seems inconsistent with the Court's conclusions in
Nebraska Press.
In this harbinger of Gentile, the Fourth Circuit, in justifying
the deferential standard of review, stressed the role of the lawyer
as an officer of the court. 64 For the Fourth Circuit, this meant
that the lawyer has a duty "to protect the judicial processes from
those extraneous influences which impair its fairness."65 Lawyers
violate this responsibility when they engage in potentially harm-
ful extrajudicial commentary "even though the prejudice itself
may be wholly or partially avoidable." 66 The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that "the reasonable likelihood test divides the innocuous
from the culpable, adds clarity to the rule and makes it more
definite in application. [It found] no requirement in the Constitu-
tion of anything else."167 Hirschkop suggests that a lawyer can be
restrained even when the order is broad and reasonable alterna-
tive means are available. 61 It reflects a sharp departure from the
precedent recognizing the presumptive invalidity of content-based
regulation.
158. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975); see also supra
notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
159. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
160. Id. at 370.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 363 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
163. Id. at 365.
164. Id. at 366.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 367.
167. Id. at 370.
168. See id. at 366.
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For Judge Winter, dissenting in Hirschkop, uncertainties in
what extrajudicial commentary might create a reasonable likeli-
hood of prejudice would force lawyers to speculate on unforeseen
consequences, creating a chilling effect on lawyer speech." 9 He
warned: "Under these circumstances, the prudent course is to
avoid all comment, no matter how remote the chance of prejudice
might seem at the time." 17 Judge Winter quoted the conclusion of
the ABA, which had amended its model rules to adopt the clear
and present danger test, in "[riecognizing that 'the reasonable
likelihood test is too relaxed to provide full protection to the
[F]irst [A]mendment interests of attorneys.""7 '
While the Fourth and Seventh Circuits differed over the consti-
tutionality of standing rules using the "reasonable likelihood"
test, in Gentile v. State Bar,172 the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the "substantial likelihood" of material prejudice
test.173 Nevada had adopted Model Rule 3.6 in its local discipli-
nary Rule 177.17' Dominic Gentile's client was indicted on crimi-
nal charges.175 After extensive publicity adverse to his client,
Gentile concluded that he was obliged to respond and called a
press conference. 176 The night before the conference, he carefully
planned his remarks in light of Rule 177.77 At the press confer-
ence, he asserted his client's innocence, claimed that it was
probably a police officer who had committed the crime, and
charged that his client was a scapegoat for a crooked police de-
partment. 7 ' Six months after the press conference, Gentile's cli-
ent was acquitted. 179 However, the Southern Nevada Disciplinary
Board of the State Bar determined, following a hearing, that Gen-
tile had violated Rule 177 and recommended a private repri-
mand.8 0 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.'
169. See id. at 380 (Winter, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Winter, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 381 (Winter, J., dissenting) (quoting STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS STANDARD 3 (1978)).
172. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
173. Id. at 1063.
174. Id. at 1033.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1039-43.
177. Id. at 1044.
178. Id. at 1045.





The Supreme Court reversed." 2 In an opinion by Justice Ken-
nedy, the Court held 5-4 that the safe harbor provision of the
rules was unconstitutionally vague.1 3 The Court went on, how-
ever, to hold in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the five justice majority, "that the 'substantial likelihood of mate-
rial prejudice' standard applied by Nevada and most other States
satisfies the First Amendment." " The Court found that the stan-
dard, while admittedly not as protective of lawyer speech as the
clear and present danger doctrine, "constitute[d] a constitution-
ally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of
attorneys ... and the State's interest in fair trials."'85
The Court's methodology in Gentile should not be read as a
simple ad hoc balancing test (which I believe to be a fair assess-
ment of the reasonable likelihood standard).8 6 The Chief Justice
described Rule 177 as "designed to protect the integrity and fair-
ness of a State's judicial system" and the interest in protecting
the right to a fair trial from extrajudicial commentary as most
"fundamental." 7 The Court determined that the restraint on
speech embodied in the disciplinary rule was "narrowly tailored"
to achieve those objectives because: (1) it was limited to speech
that was substantially likely to have a material effect; (2) "it
[was] neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all attor-
neys;" and (3) it only delayed the speech until the trial con-
cluded.' 8
On the other hand, the Chief Justice admitted he was not en-
gaging in strict scrutiny analysis or using what I consider to be
the formulaic equivalent, the clear and present danger doctrine.8 9
There was no requirement that the trial court conduct a hearing
and make record findings that less restrictive means were un-
available. In fact, the Court noted that alternatives to the re-
straint on speech "entail serious costs to the system" and con-
182. Id. at 1058.
183. Id. at 1048.
184. Id. at 1063. Justice O'Connor provided the crucial fifth vote in both opinions. See
id. at 1032.
185. Id. at 1075.
186. See SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 15:46, p. 15-73 ("A careful reading of Gentile shows
that the opinion of the Chief Justice clearly understood the 'substantial likelihood of mate-
rial prejudice' formula as a variant of intermediate scrutiny.").
187. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075.
188. Id. at 1076.
189. See id. at 1072-74.
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cluded that "[t]he State has a substantial interest in preventing
officers of the court, such as lawyers, from imposing such costs on
the judicial system and on the litigants."9 ' In the regimen of Ne-
braska Press and strict scrutiny, however, such costs are accept-
able given the importance of freedom of speech and press, espe-
cially speech concerning the operation of our justice system.
Under the more demanding constitutional standards, viewpoint
neutrality is insufficient; presumptive invalidity applies when the
state regulates speech based on its content. Delays in speech or
publication, which the Chief Justice considers to operate to nar-
row the regulation, are unacceptable. I believe that the Gentile
analysis is best understood as a form of intermediate scrutiny,
comparable to the O'Brien test.'9 '
Disciplinary rules, however, are a form of content-based regula-
tion. Government regulates because of the harm believed to be
caused by the extrajudicial commentary of trial participants.
Rules are set forth in terms of particular subject matters which
presumptively create a substantial likelihood of material preju-
dice. Such regulation is usually presumptively invalid and subject
to strict scrutiny.'92 Further, disciplinary rules involve speech
important to the public. As Justice Kennedy stated: "The judicial
system, and in particular our criminal justice courts, play a vital
part in a democratic state, and the public has a legitimate inter-
est in their operations."'93 As applied to Gentile, Rule 177 oper-
ated to restrain speech charging corruption in the police depart-
ment and a cover-up using Gentile's client as a scapegoat.' This
was core political speech central to First Amendment concerns.'95
The question, then, is whether such a marked departure from
regular First Amendment analysis is justified. The Gentile Court
offers two such justifications. First, the Chief Justice warned of
an increased threat of prejudice because lawyers' commentary
will "be received as especially authoritative" because of their
190. Id. at 1075.
191. Justice Kennedy uses the language of O'Brien in applying the substantial likeli-
hood of material prejudice test to Gentile's speech. See id. at 1054. See also supra note 186;
supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (describing the O'Brien test).
192. See supra note 45.
193. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1035 (plurality opinion).
194. Id. at 1045. Justice Kennedy stated: "There is no question that speech critical of
the exercise of the State's power lies at the very center of the First Amendment." Id. at
1034 (plurality opinion). He refers to Gentile's speech as "lying at the core of the First
Amendment." Id. at 1035 (plurality opinion).
195. Id. at 1034-35 (plurality opinion).
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"special access to information through discovery and client com-
munication."'96 Second, and more importantly, the Court stressed
the role of lawyers as "officers of the court."9 '
At the outset, it should be noted that the first justification,
based on threat of prejudice, is entirely speculative. The Chief
Justice offered no empirical support for the claim that the speech
of attorneys involves a greater threat of prejudice, and I know of
none. 9 ' It is hard to believe that Gentile's act of setting forth the
defense theory of the case and asserting his client's innocence or a
prosecutor's comments on the merits of the case are any more po-
tentially harmful than media publication concerning evidence
such as confessions, eyewitness accounts, etc.'99 Yet media publi-
cation concerning such potentially prejudicial information enjoys
far greater constitutional protection than the speech of lawyers.
Further, Nebraska Press and its progeny argue that alternative
means of avoiding prejudice, although not without costs, are usu-
ally effective in avoiding prejudice. Restraints on press publica-
tion are overturned routinely, usually based on availability of al-
ternatives. °° Indeed, the real uncertainty is whether a restraint
196. Id. at 1074.
197. Id. at 1074-76 (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976)).
198. While there is dispute about the prejudicial effects of publicity, it does seem likely
that the effects are not great. Justice Kennedy in Gentile stated:
Empirical research suggests that in the few instances when jurors have been
exposed to extensive and prejudicial publicity, they are able to disregard it
and base their verdict upon the evidence presented in court.... Our col-
leagues' historical survey notwithstanding, respondent has not demonstrated
any sufficient state interest in restricting the speech of attorneys to justify a
lower standard of First Amendment scrutiny.
Id. at 1054-55 (plurality opinion); see Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-
Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free
Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 35 (1989) ("The evidence also indicates that the magni-
tude of the fair trial-free press issue may be overblown."); Rita J. Simon, Does the Court's
Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors
of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515, 528 (1977) ("Experiments to date indicate that
for the most part juries are able and willing to put aside extraneous information and base
their decisions on the evidence.").
199. Anderson, supra note 10, at 649, similarly argues that it was highly improbable
that Gentile's remarks could realistically threaten the integrity of the proceeding. He con-
cludes:
It is hard to escape the conclusion that Gentile was punished-and lawyers
will be silenced in the future-for reasons that have less to do with making
sure that trials reach right results than with indicating the unrealistic ideal
that Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed in Gentile: "[Liaw suits should be
tried in court, not in the media."
Id. (quoting Gentile, 1030 U.S. at 1080 n.6 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
200. See DrENES, supra note 1, § 2-1(d) n.98.
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on lawyers' extrajudicial commentary can really dry up the flow
of information and opinion to the media given the reality of
"leaks." More likely, the media will be forced to rely on less accu-
rate, perhaps more biased, sources for news.2"' Finally, even if we
assume that the Gentile Court is correct in its speculations on
prejudice, that would justify at best only a very limited restraint
directed at the use of the lawyers' special information. Put an-
other way, the danger of prejudice goes to the application of the
standard for restraint, not whether a diminished standard of
speech protection should apply. As Justice Kennedy stated: "Rule
177, on its face and as applied here, is neither limited to nor even
directed at preventing release of information received through
court proceedings or special access afforded attorneys."2 2 Justice
Kennedy also argued that the "authoritativeness" of lawyers is in
fact a reason for especially protecting their speech.20 3
It is the argument that lawyers are officers of the court with
special fiduciary duties that really drives Gentile, Justice
O'Connor's pivotal concurring opinion, and lower courts that de-
part from strict scrutiny review. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Gen-
tile, stated that "[1lawyers representing clients in pending cases
are key participants in the criminal justice system, and the State
may demand some adherence to the precepts of that system in
regulating their speech as well as their conduct."20 4 This has been
a recurrent theme in cases involving the professional responsibili-
ties of lawyers and is reflected in the disciplinary rules.20 ' Ac-
201. Anderson, supra note 10, at 635, argues that gag orders on lawyers have been "a
spectacular failure. Neither disciplinary rules nor court orders can stop lawyers from
talking to the media." He adds that "[a]ttempts to control the flow of information to media
from other sources ... are even more ineffectual." Id. at 636.
202. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1053 (plurality opinion).
203. Id. at 1056-57 (plurality opinion).
Because attorneys participate in the criminal justice system and are trained
in its complexities, they hold unique qualifications as a source of information
about pending cases.... To the extent the press and public rely upon attor-
neys for information because attorneys are well informed, this may prove the
value to the public of speech by members of the bar.
Id. (plurality opinion).
204. Id. at 1074. Justice O'Connor, concurring, similarly stated: "Lawyers are officers
of the court and, as such, may legitimately be subject to ethical precepts that keep them
from engaging in what otherwise might be constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 1081-
82 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
205. The Court relies primarily on In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1959) (Stewart,
J., concurring) ("Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other
circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech."). Justice Brennan, concurring
in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), stated that "[ais officers of the
court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public
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cepting that the lawyer is an officer of the court, however, does
not tell us anything about what this status entails or what ex-
trajudicial commentary constitutes a violation of the lawyer's fi-
duciary duty. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that an
inferential leap is involved:
[Tihe descriptive statement that attorneys are officers of the court
does not justify the normative conclusion that a lesser standard of
constitutional review should be used in reviewing restrictions on at-
torney speech. Even accepting the characterization that lawyers are
officers of the court, that says nothing about the duties that are at-
tendant to this role.h
6
Some lower courts seem to treat the fiduciary role of the lawyer
as justifying a ban on any extrajudicial commentary, which may
have been the earliest approach. If the lawyer speaks about the
case outside of the courtroom, he violates his responsibility. But
none of the modern disciplinary rules go that far. The more ex-
treme positions restricting attorney free speech, e.g., "special en-
vironment" contexts, sound very much like the speech of govern-
ment employees, in which the courts show extreme deference to
claimed governmental expertise.0 7 The disciplinary rules of five
states and the District of Columbia, some lower courts, and the
Gentile plurality take the position that the fiduciary role of the
lawyer requires only that he or she avoid extrajudicial commen-
tary that creates a serious and imminent threat of prejudice.208 I
would add to this the express requirement that the harm must be
unavoidable by less restrictive means, which I believe is implicit
in the clear and present danger doctrine. 09
debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair ad-
ministration of justice." Id. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally Kevin Cole
& Fred C. Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1627 (1996); Minnefor, supra note 132; Weinreb, supra note 132.
206. Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 872.
207. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing restraints on govern-
ment employees' speech).
208. See supra text accompanying note 156 (observing states' use of the clear and pres-
ent danger doctrine or its equivalent). Justice Kennedy stated:
At the very least, however, we can say that the Rule which punished peti-
tioner's statements represents a limitation of First Amendment freedoms
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular gov-
ernmental interest, and does not protect against a danger of the necessary
gravity, imminence, or likelihood.
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1057-58 (plurality opinion).
209. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("Only an emergency can justify repression."); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-
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In summary, the very nature of disciplinary rules as content-
based regulations of speech concerning the operations of the jus-
tice system mandates strict scrutiny. The Gentile Court's ration-
ale for departing from the rule of the presumptive invalidity of
such restraints is inadequate. In Part Five, I focus more particu-
larly on the affirmative values of lawyer speech to the speaker, to
his or her client, and to the public. The nature of the restraint
imposed by disciplinary rules and the importance of the freedom
of speech and press rights at stake mandate strict scrutiny re-
view.
C. The "Reasonable Likelihood" Standard
After Gentile, the primary constitutional issue regarding
standing disciplinary rules is the validity of those rules employ-
ing the "reasonable likelihood" standard. Following Gentile, four
states abandoned that deferential standard in favor of a more
speech-protective disciplinary rule.21° As indicated above, prior to
Gentile, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits had come to different
conclusions on the First Amendment validity of the reasonable
likelihood rule.2 '
In In re Morrissey,2 12 the Fourth Circuit again considered the
reasonable likelihood standard and, once again, upheld its consti-
tutionality.213 Morrissey, an experienced lawyer, was convicted of
two counts of criminal contempt for violating Local Rule 57 of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia.21 The charges against Morrissey arose from extrajudicial
commentary made to the press in connection with his defense of
Joel W. Harris, a longtime Richmond, Virginia political figure.21 5
Harris had been charged with drug distribution, with claims of
31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Only the emergency that makes it immediately dan-
gerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to
the sweeping [First Amendment] command....").
210. See SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 15:46 n.12.
211. See supra notes 131-33, 146-56 and accompanying text.
212. 168 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1999). See generally SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 15:46 (dis-
cussing Morrissey). Professor Smolla wrote the petition for certiorari for Morrissey. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 2394 (1999) (mem.).
213. Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 136.
214. Id. at 135.
215. Id. at 136.
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trading drugs for sex and political persecution, adding to the
case's notoriety.216 In spite of warnings about the disciplinary
rule, Morrissey held a press conference during which he made
comments regarding the case and played a videotape of a major
prosecution witness before the grand jury recanting his testi-
mony.217 Several weeks later, Morrissey gave a newspaper inter-
view in which he stated that the charges against Harris never
"should have been filed" and that, if the charges had occurred
when he headed the state prosecutor's office, they "would have
been laughed out of court."218
These two incidents provided the basis for Morrissey's con-
tempt conviction. He was sentenced to thirty days for the first
violation of Rule 57 and sixty additional days on the second
count.219 The federal district court held that Morrissey's extraju-
dicial commentary created a reasonable likelihood of prejudice
involving comments regarding prospective witnesses and opinions
on the merits of the evidence, as provided for in the disciplinary
rules.220 Rejecting Morrissey's argument that Gentile implicitly
invalidated the less speech protective "reasonable likelihood"
standard, the court upheld the constitutionality of Rule 57.221
The Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on its earlier decisions in
Hirschkop v. Snead222 and In re Russell,22 rejected Morrissey's fa-
cial challenge to Rule 57 and affirmed.224 In spite of Morrissey's
argument that Gentile had established a constitutional minimum
that necessarily rendered the "reasonable likelihood" test uncon-
stitutional, the Fourth Circuit rejected the claim.22 While I would
like to agree with Morrissey's argument, I cannot do so. Simply,
the Gentile Court did not address the lesser standard. All the
Court did was reject the necessity of showing a serious and immi-
nent threat of prejudice. 6 While the Court did say that the "sub-
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 137.
219. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2394 (1999) (mem.).
220. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 137.
221. In re Morrissey, 996 F. Supp. 530, 538-40 (E.D. Va. 1998).
222. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
223. 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1984).
224. Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 141.
225. Id. at 139.
226. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1063 (1991).
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stantial likelihood" test provided sufficient protection given the
lower standards applicable to lawyer's speech, it did not say that
this was a constitutional minimum.227
The Fourth Circuit did err, however, when it found support for
its holding in United States v. Cutler.22 In Cutler, the Second Cir-
cuit applied the "reasonable likelihood" standard in local rules to
affirm sanctions against Bruce Cutler, mob-leader John Gotti's
lawyer.229 But the Court expressly avoided the constitutional is-
sue by invoking the collateral bar rule against Cutler.
In sum, Cutler could have, and should have, sought modification of
the orders in district court, challenged them on a direct appeal, or
sought a writ of mandamus or declaratory relief. Having failed ut-
terly to make any good faith effort to undertake even one of these
steps, he cannot now challenge the orders' validity.
230
This merely returns us to the basic issue: Does the reasonable
likelihood standard in Local Rule 57 satisfy the First Amendment
mandate? In holding that it does, the Fourth Circuit invoked the
Supreme Court's holding in Procunier v. Martinez,23' a 1974 deci-
sion involving censorship of prisoner mail, as setting forth the
First Amendment standard for content-based regulation of
speech.232 Since speech in prisons is a special environment in-
volving a markedly more deferential constitutional scrutiny, the
court's choice of precedent is questionable. If it signifies that law-
yers' extrajudicial commentary is to be judged by the deferential
standards used in the prison speech cases, it devalues lawyer
speech far below what the Supreme Court did in Gentile.233
227. See id.
228. 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995).
229. Id. at 837-38.
230. Id. at 833.
231. 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
232. Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 140.
233. In Gentile, the Court used its commercial speech precedent to characterize the
First Amendment protection accorded attorney sl eech.
Even in an area far from the courtroom and the pendency of a case, our deci-
sions dealing with a lawyer's right undekthe First Amendment to solicit
business and advertise, contrary to promulgated rules of ethics, have not
suggested that lawyers are protected by the First Amendment to the same
extent as those engaged in other businesses.
Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1073 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (citing Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S.
9 (1990); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)). "In each of these cases, we
engaged in a balancing process, weighing the State's interest in the regulation of a spe-
cialized profession against a lawyer's First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that
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There is no doubt, as the Morrissey court held, that "the right
to a fair criminal trial by an impartial jury" is a compelling state
interest.234 The real issues are whether there is a "reasonable
likelihood" of prejudice and whether a restraint is "narrowly tai-
lored enough to be no greater than necessary to protect the gov-
ernment interest involved."235 This sounds like the language of
the O'Brien test.236 The Fourth Circuit purported to use the same
criteria of narrow tailoring adopted by the Supreme Court in Gen-
tile, suggesting that there is no real constitutional difference be-
tween the two standards.2 ' But certainly one of the factors cited
by the Gentile Court which the reasonable likelihood standard
does not satisfy is that there exists a "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice."23
The Supreme Court in Gentile expressly recognized that the
reasonable likelihood test provides less protection to speech than
does the substantial likelihood test.2 9  Similarly, in Press-
Enterprise II, the Court held that a reasonable likelihood stan-
dard is constitutionally inadequate to satisfy the constitutionally
mandated substantial likelihood standard. ° Morrissey provides
no justification for the diminished standard. That Rule 57 might
have been applied to Morrissey in a way that would satisfy the
O'Brien standard does not establish its facial validity.
The reasonable likelihood standard is, I believe, inadequate to
satisfy the First Amendment mandate. All of the reasons leading
me to reject the more demanding Gentile constitutional analysis
apply more forcefully to the deferential reasonableness standard.
Subjecting a content-based regulation of political speech to, at
best, an ad hoc balancing regimen is inadequate to satisfy First
was at issue." Id. The commercial speech precedent reflects a form of intermediate scru-
tiny akin to O'Brien. In recent cases, the Court has enhanced the protection accorded to
commercial speech. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
234. Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 140.
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 80-84 (discussing the O'Brien test).
237. See Morrissey, 168 F.3d at 140.
238. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 passim (1991) (emphasis added). The Fourth
Circuit stated that "Local Rule 57 is narrow in that it prohibits only the statements that
are likely to threaten the right to a fair trial and an impartial jury." Morrissey, 168 F.3d at
140.
239. Gentile, 501U.S. at 1068.
240. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (striking down a California statute that
allowed courts to prohibit access by the public if the defendant established a "reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice").
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Amendment requirements, especially given the affirmative value
of lawyer speech to the speaker, her client, and the public.
IV. JUDICIAL RESTRAINING (GAG) ORDERS
A. Participant Gag Orders As Prior Restraints
Even if standing disciplinary rules are constitutional using less
speech protective standards of review, this should not be deter-
minative of the validity of judicial gag orders on trial participants
that adopt the same formulation. Even if Gentile is accepted, a
gag order embodying a "substantial likelihood" standard should
not withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Finally, even if Morris-
sey is correct that a "reasonable likelihood" standard in a discipli-
nary rule is constitutional, this should not mean that a similar
judicial gag order is constitutional. A content-based gag order on
political speech, unlike the standing disciplinary rule, should be
subject to the prior restraint doctrine.
As I indicated above, a judicial restraining order based on
speech content is generally a prior restraint subject to "a 'heavy
presumption' against its constitutional validity."24' It might seem,
at least after Nebraska Press, that a judicial gag order on trial
participants is clearly subject to the prior restraint doctrine. In
form, the gag order is a judicial injunction restraining speech on
the basis of its content.242 In purpose, operation, and effect, a re-
straint on trial participants suppresses speech before it enters the
marketplace of ideas. It is based on speculation concerning possi-
ble future harm that will flow from extrajudicial commentary
241. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (quoting Carroll v. Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963));
see supra Part II.B.1 (discussing treatment ofjudicial gag orders as prior restraints).
242. While the Court in Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993), held that a
forfeiture order in an obscenity case was not a prior restraint, the Court stated:
The term "prior restraint" is used "to describe administrative and judicial or-
ders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time
that such communications are to occur." Temporary restraining orders and
permanent injunctions-i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activi-
ties-are classic examples of prior restraints. This understanding of what
constitutes a prior restraint is borne out by our cases, even those on which
petitioner relies.
Id. at 550 (quoting M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, at 4-16 (1984)
(emphasis added)); see also State v. Bassett, 911 P.2d 385, 387 (Wash. 1996) (en banc)
("The trial court's order forbids future communications [by counsel] and is therefore a
prior restraint on the exercise of free speech.").
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that has not yet occurred. As the Court stated in Near v. Minne-
sota: "This is the essence of censorship."243
The presumptive invalidity of prior restraints is based, in part,
on the chilling effect of such restraints.2' Gag orders on trial par-
ticipants are more likely to chill speech than standing orders.
Even when gag orders use standards based on the disciplinary
rules, they often do not include the particular statements in the
rules used to guide attorneys. The threat of judicial contempt
sanctions is real, concrete, particularized, and immediate. For
lawyers who may well appear in the future before the same judge
who issues the gag order, the restraint is especially likely to pose
a formidable obstacle to speech.
The gag order is an inviting tool for the trial judge charged
with an affirmative duty of preserving the fairness of the judicial
proceedings. Just as a censor's job is to censor, the trial judge's
job is to protect the administration of justice. With other methods
of controlling potentially harmful publicity generally unavailable,
a restraint on extrajudicial speech, especially by the lawyer, that
offers a much greater likelihood of withstanding appellate scru-
tiny is an attractive alternative. 5 Justice Nelson of the Montana
Supreme Court, in a dissenting opinion, captured this impetus to
play the censor:
Gag orders are simply too easy to impose....
[A] court anxious to maintain the appearance of tight control
over the case and counsel, fearful that its rulings may be publicly
criticized, concerned over the threat of adverse pretrial publicity, de-
termined to preemptively head off change of venue problems and the
possibility of having to sequester the jury with the attendant impact
on the local treasury, and set on making sure that the case is tried
locally, will find little difficulty in gagging at least some of the trial
participants. I greatly fear that although we have not allowed the
"primrose path that leads to destruction of those societal values that
open, public trials promote" to advance into courtroom, we have now
243. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
244. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988);
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1971); Org. for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,418-19 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1971); Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 723
(1931).
245. See Levenson, supra note 10, at 306 ("For the trial court faced with a complicated
trial surrounded by immense and intense public and media interest, the temptation to rely
on gag orders can be overwhelming.").
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effectively paved precisely such a route from the courthouse door to
the reporter's desk.
246
Further, the gag order is subject to the collateral bar doc-
trine.247 Standing orders can be tested when they are enforced.
But trial participants cannot simply talk about a case to the me-
dia and then challenge the constitutionality of a gag order when a
show cause order is issued. Even if the judicial order is patently
frivolous, it must be obeyed, at least if expedited appellate review
is available.248
It is not surprising, then, that the prior restraint doctrine gen-
erally is used when trial participants, other than lawyers, chal-
lenge a gag order on their speech. For example, in United States
v. Ford,249 the Sixth Circuit applied prior restraint analysis to a
broad gag order restraining Congressman Harold Ford, the defen-
dant in a federal mail and bank fraud case, from making extraju-
dicial comments concerning the case. ° The court rejected the
government's argument that the order should be upheld under a
"reasonable likelihood" test.2 ' The appellate court, stressing the
political context of the case and the mandate of Nebraska Press,
used the clear and present danger test and strict scrutiny: "In the
instant case, no facts were found which would suggest 'a serious
and imminent threat,' and the order was neither narrowly tai-
lored nor directed to any specific situation. Nor was there any
specific consideration of the less burdensome alternatives of voir
dire, sequestration or change of venue."252
246. Montana ex rel. Missoulian v. Mont. Twenty-First Judicial Dist. Court, 933 P.2d
829, 843-44 (Mont. 1997) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Great Falls
Tribune v. Dist. Court, 608 P.2d 116, 121 (Mont. 1980)).
247. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (providing examples of application of the
collateral bar doctrine in the context of media publication). See generally SMOLLA, supra
note 2, §§ 15:72-15:76; Richard Labunski, The "Collateral Bar" Rule and the First Amend-
ment: The Constitutionality of Enforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 323
(1998); Richard Labunski, A First Amendment Exception to the "Collateral Bar" Rule: Pro-
tecting Freedom of Expression and the Legitimacy of Courts, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 405 (1995).
248. See In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1352 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on
reh'g en banc, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a publisher who is subject to a
transparently unconstitutional prior restraint may make a good faith effort to seek emer-
gency relief from an appellate court before publishing).
249. 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987); see also McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council
Conduct and Disability Orders, 83 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that a confiden-
tiality clause in a statute providing for judicial misconduct proceedings was a prior re-
straint as applied to the judge who was the subject of the proceeding and wanted to speak
about the concluded proceedings to give his perspective and attempt to vindicate his repu-
tation).
250. Ford, 830 F.2d at 598-600.
251. Id. at598.
252. Id. at 600.
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B. Litigating the Prior Restraint Doctrine
The applicability of the prior restraint doctrine and its opera-
tion, however, does appear to be less certain and more ambivalent
when it is trial participants, and especially lawyers, who are
bound. Further, the courts are sharply divided on whether the
doctrine even applies when it is the nonparty media that is chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the gag order.
In Levine v. United States,253 a former FBI agent was charged
with espionage, and his attorneys sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the district court to dissolve its gag order prohibiting at-
torneys in the case from communicating with the media concern-
ing the merits of the case." 4 The Ninth Circuit initially noted that
the order did not directly restrain the press and that the litigants
lacked third party standing to raise the newsgathering rights of
the media. 5 The court agreed, however, that the trial court's or-
der did constitute a prior restraint on the attorneys' speech.5 6
Therefore, the restraint was subject to a heavy presumption of
invalidity and strict scrutiny applied "because of the peculiar
dangers presented by such restraints."257 Such an order could be
upheld only if the clear and present danger test was satisfied, the
order was narrowly tailored, and no less restrictive means were
available. 8
Surprisingly, in light of Nebraska Press and its progeny, the
Ninth Circuit held that the record did support the district court's
finding that extrajudicial commentary by counsel posed a serious
and imminent threat to the administration of justice, that the re-
straint on trial participants would be highly effective in curbing
the extensive prejudicial publicity, and that the various alterna-
tives to a gag order "would be either ineffective or counterproduc-
tive."259 Nevertheless, the court granted mandamus because the
order was not narrowly drawn; it was overbroad.Y The order
failed to identify the types of extrajudicial statements that would
satisfy the clear and present danger doctrine.2
253. 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985).
254. Id. at 591.
255. Id. at 594.
256. Id. at 595.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 600.
260. Id. at 599.
261. Id.
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While the appellate court in Levine invoked strict scrutiny, its
application of the standard differed remarkably from the rigorous
scrutiny appellate courts used in reviewing trial court gag orders
on the press after Nebraska Press. The Ninth Circuit's analysis in
Levine was driven by the fact that it was trial participants, espe-
cially lawyers, who were the subjects of the gag order. Citing
dicta from Sheppard, Nebraska Press, and other precedent indi-
cating that trial counsel have reduced speech rights, the court
stressed the need to evaluate the trial court's order "in light of the
relationship between the petitioners and the court system."262
While "it is appropriate to impose greater restrictions on the [par-
ticipants'] free speech rights," the court added that trial partici-
pants "do not lose their constitutional rights at the courthouse
door."263 Levine suggests that, even when trial participants, espe-
cially lawyers, assert their own rights in challenging a gag order
and the prior restraint doctrine formally applies, the rigor of the
judicial scrutiny may be diminished because of the identity of the
parties. As my criticism of Gentile suggests, I reject this ap-
proach.
Following the issuance of the mandamus in Levine, the district
court held a hearing and issued a new amended gag order pro-
hibiting extrajudicial commentary regarding six identified sub-
jects.264 The press filed for mandamus claiming that the amended
order was an unconstitutional prior restraint.26 In Radio & Tele-
vision News Association v. United States District Court, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the applicability of the prior restraint doctrine
and upheld the gag order.266 While acknowledging that the press
had constitutional standing to challenge the gag order based on
injury to its ability to gather the news, the appellate court held
that the press "lacks standing to assert the free speech constitu-
tional rights of the nonparty trial counsel in challenging this or-
der."26 The third party standing doctrine, which bars a litigant
from litigating the legal rights of nonparties, removed the prior
restraint doctrine from the case.
262. Id. at 595-96.
263. Id. at 595. The courts have used similar language in restrictive environment cases
involving students, prisoners, and the military, where diminished First Amendment pro-
tections apply. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
264. See Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443,
1444 (9th Cir. 1986).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1446-48.
267. Id. at 1448.
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The third party standing rule is a prudential rule based on ju-
dicial self-restraint that competing interests can override. The
court in RTNA, however, never balanced the competing interests
to determine whether the press should be allowed to assert the
First Amendment right of the trial participants. I would argue
that the third party standing rule should not be used to bar the
press from litigating the right of trial participants to be free of
prior restraint. First, there is the public interest in preventing
censorship of the speech of trial participants. Second, there is the
very real possibility that the parties, especially lawyers who must
litigate this case and future cases before the trial judge imposing
the order, might be chilled in protecting their rights. If the media
is prevented from raising the prior restraint doctrine, the censor-
ship may well go unchallenged. Third, consideration should be
given to the public interest in speech involving the operation of
our justice system. Finally, the values underlying the prior re-
straint doctrine itself suggest that the prudential values under-
lying the third party rules be set aside.
The appellate court in RTNA dismissed summarily the "tenu-
ous "268 constitutional rights of the press as representative of the
public: "[The media's collateral interest in interviewing trial par-
ticipants is outside the scope of protection offered by the [F]irst
[A]mendment."2 69 The press remained free to attend the trial,
gather what news it could, and publish what it chose. ° Indeed,
reporters could ask the gagged attorneys questions, but the law-
yers "may not be free to answer."27' Gag orders on trial partici-
pants are therefore distinguishable, said the court, from cases in
which the courts are closed or press publication is restrained.
7 2
Because the First Amendment rights of the press were, at best,
only indirectly or incidentally burdened and the restraint was
reasonably related to the government interest in limiting prejudi-
cial publicity, the Constitution was satisfied.273
In In re Application of Dow Jones & Co.,274 a case involving de-
fense contract fraud charges against Wedtech Co. and bribery
268. Id. at 1445.
269. Id. at 1447.
270. Id. at 1446.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 1447-48.
274. 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988).
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charges against Congressman Mario Biaggi and others,27 the
Second Circuit also held that the prior restraint doctrine is inap-
plicable in a challenge to a participant gag order brought by the
media. 6 While the media was held to have constitutional stand-
ing "as recipients of speech"277 (the court avoided press injury to
engage in newsgathering on behalf of the public), the gag order
was not a prior restraint. 7 ' The media could not assert the defen-
dants' First Amendment rights when the defendants themselves
failed to challenge the restraining order. 9
In Dow Jones, the court argued that the gag order was not a
prior restraint on the press because it was not bound by the or-
der.28 ° If a trial participant spoke in violation of the order, the
press could not be sanctioned.281 In short, there was no censorship
of the press.282
Although the restraining order in this case limits the flow of infor-
mation readily available to the news agencies-and for that reason
might have an effect similar to that of a prior restraint-the fact
that the order is not directed at the news agencies and that they
therefore cannot be haled into court for violating its terms deflates
what would otherwise be a serious concern regarding judicial censor-
ship of the press.283
While press freedom was implicated, the gag order did so only
"indirectly."284 Borrowing from local disciplinary rules on attor-
neys, the Dow Jones court held that the gag order was constitu-
tional if "there [was] a 'reasonable likelihood' that pretrial pub-
licity [would] prejudice a fair trial."285 Surprisingly, the court
275. Id. at 604-05.
276. Id. at 609.
277. Id. at 608.
278. Id. at 609.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 608.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. Id.; see Sioux Falls Argus Leader v. Miller, 610 N.W.2d 76, 80 (S.D. 2000) (finding
that the media has standing to challenge a gag order on trial participants because the or-
der restricts its rights as a recipient of speech, but declining to apply the prior restraint
doctrine because the order does not gag the media, and holding that the order did not vio-
late the media's limited First Amendment right to gather and report the news).
284. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 609; see also Sioux Falls Argus Leader, 610 N.W.2d at 85
("Since the gag order does not directly restrain the press, it is not held to the same level of
scrutiny as prior restraints and will be upheld if 'reasonable.'").
285. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 610 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363
(1966)); see also Sioux Falls Argus Leader, 610 N.W.2d at 86 (citing Dow Jones).
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cited Nebraska Press (a prior restraint case) for the principle that
less restrictive alternatives had to be considered. 6 Unsurpris-
ingly, in Dow Jones, the appellate court found the trial judge had
carefully considered alternatives and found them inadequate." 7
Again, gag orders on press publication seldom survive the de-
mand that there be no effective alternative for avoiding prejudice.
There is, however, an alternative line of precedent. In CBS,
Inc. v. Young,8 8 the media successfully challenged a gag order on
trial participants issued in a civil action arising from the Ohio
National Guard's killing of students at Kent State University.
28 9
Even though the media was not a party to the underlying civil ac-
tion, the media was held to have standing to challenge the order
because "its ability to gather the news concerning the trial [was]
directly impaired or curtailed. The protected right to publish the
news would be of little value in the absence of sources from which
to obtain it."
290
Invoking the prior restraint doctrine and the clear and present
danger test, the appellate court invalidated the gag order.29' The
restrictive character of the gag order was compounded by its
vagueness and sweeping character.292
We find the order to be an extreme example of a prior restraint upon
freedom of speech and expression and one that cannot escape the
proscriptions of the First Amendment, unless it is shown to have
been required to obviate serious and imminent threats to the fair-
ness and integrity of the trial.
2 93
The presumptive invalidity of the gag order was not overcome.294
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Journal Publishing Co. v.
Mechem295 applied the prior restraint doctrine to a press chal-
lenge to a post-trial gag order preventing jurors from discussing
286. Id. at 611.
287. Id.
288. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
289. Id. at 242.
290. Id. at 237-38. The Sixth Circuit added that "this order affected [CBS's] constitu-
tionally guaranteed right as a member of the press to gather news." Id. at 238.
291. Id. at 238-42 (citing Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (1970)).
292. See id. at 239.
293. Id. at 240.
294. Id. at 241-42.
295. 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986).
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their verdict with the press.296 The court held that "any inhibi-
tions against news coverage of a trial carry a heavy presumption
of an unconstitutional prior restraint."297 Citing Young and cases
involving the right of public access to court proceedings, the court
applied the clear and present danger doctrine and strict scru-
tiny.29 The court held the sweeping order, prohibiting all post-
trial interviews, to be impermissibly overbroad.299
Again, in Connecticut Magazine v. Monaghan,"' a federal dis-
trict court, in an action brought by the press, enjoined enforce-
ment of a gag order in a state criminal proceeding.3"' Because the
trial court order impaired the press's ability to gather the news
and thereby implicated freedom of the press, the press had
standing to challenge the order even though it was not a party or
subject to the order.0 2 The federal court, using the prior restraint
doctrine, stated: "An order prohibiting extrajudicial comments by
counsel constitutes a prior restraint on the right to gather news
and derivatively on publication."0 3 Applying Nebraska Press, the
federal court enjoined the use of the gag order because the state
court did not hold hearings and make on-the-record findings that
less restrictive means were unavailable.0 4 Further, the gag order
was overbroad because it was not narrowly tailored to statements
that raised a reasonable likelihood of prejudice.3 5
I find the position of courts in such cases as RTNA and Dow
296. Id. at 1235.
297. Id. at 1236.
298. Id. at 1236-37.
299. Id. at 1237.
300. 676 F. Supp. 38 (D. Conn. 1987).
301. Id. at 39.
302. Id. at 40.
303. Id. at 42.
304. Id. at 43.
305. Id. at 43-44. Similarly, in Dow Jones & Co. v. Kaye, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla.
2000), the court issued a preliminary injunction against a state court that prevented en-
forcement of a gag order barring parties in a tort action against tobacco companies from
communicating about the case. Id. at 1363. The court noted that there is a split on the ap-
propriate standards when the media seeks to challenge restraints on trial participants. Id.
at 1359-60. While not clear on which position it adopted, the court held that the gag order
was "not supported by the record and [was] therefore unconstitutional on its face." Id. at
1361. The court cited Nebraska Press and stated that "[t]he record fails to show that the
gag order.. . was necessary to ensure a fair trial." Id. at 1360. There was no finding that
publicity "seriously threatened the fairness of the trial" or "whether measures short of a
gag order would suffice to combat the perceived threat." Id. The court found that the gag
order was "overbroad in scope and of indefinite duration." Id. In short, the court applied a
demanding standard of review similar to that applied in Nebraska Press.
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Jones that reject use of the prior restraint doctrine for media
challenges to gag orders on trial participants formalistic and un-
realistic. They ignore the underlying rationale of the prior re-
straint doctrine to prevent government censorship, to assure that
speech is expressed in the marketplace of ideas, and to assure
that the citizen-critic receives information and ideas vital to his
or her role in democratic society. The purpose and effect of the ju-
dicial gag order on trial participants is to curtail such speech re-
gardless of the identity of the challenging party. Even though
RTNA and Dow Jones involved matters of vital concern to the
public, the trial courts were allowed to gag broadly the speech of
those most directly involved in the controversy; the speech of
those in the best position to inform the public was gagged. The
fact that the content-based restraint significantly burdened the
First Amendment right to gather the news was denigrated. 0 6 As
Judge Nelson of the Montana Supreme Court, dissenting in Mon-
tana ex rel. Missoulian v. Montana Twenty-First Judicial District
Court, °7 which adopted Dow Jones, said: "[Tihe distinction be-
tween a direct prior restraint (where the media is gagged) and an
indirect prior restraint (where the media's sources are gagged) is
one without a substantive difference. An indirect prior restraint
is, de facto, a prior restraint, nonetheless." °"
306. In United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878 (2000), the Court
stated: "When the purpose and design of a statute is to regulate speech by reason of its
content, special consideration or latitude is not accorded to the Government merely be-
cause the law can somehow be described as a burden rather than outright suppression."
Id. at 1893.
307. 933 P.2d 829 (Mont. 1997).
308. Id. at 844 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson added the following
[I]t seems to me that if we tell the press "you can edit and publish what you
know" and then, in the next breath, allow those sources of information from
which the media traditionally gathers its information to be silenced on any
but the most serious and compelling grounds which clearly prejudice the de-
fendant's fair trial right, we have effectively precluded the press from
"knowing," and, therefore, being able to "edit" or "publish" much of any-
thing ....
Furthermore, making prior restraint analysis dependent upon the status of
the party bringing the challenge is simply smoke and mirrors. It is purely a
legal fiction with no foothold in reality. If the court imposes a gag order on
trial participants-no matter what the level of scrutiny or what sort of test it
uses-the end result is precisely the same and is equally intrusive and offen-
sive: the media is prohibited from gathering and publishing the news and the
public is prohibited from receiving it. The fundamental rights of both are de-
nied. It is for precisely this reason that I would require the highest level of
scrutiny and the imposition of the clear and present danger standard-tradi-
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It may be true that a gag order on press publication or a clo-
sure of judicial proceedings may be a more significant and serious
burden on First Amendment rights. That does not denigrate,
however, the significance and seriousness of the burden on First
Amendment rights that the gag order on trial participants im-
poses. Trial participants are a vital source of information and
perspective on the proceedings. Deprived of this source of news,
the press will look elsewhere. It may well be that such alternative
sources will lack the understanding of the issues and proceedings
that the participants have. It is likely that the alternative sources
will have the fervor to present a particular point of view on such
matters. The press may well turn to sources having less obvious
biases than the participants. In short, the restraint skews the
newsgathering process and impacts what the press publishes and
what is communicated to the public." 9
C. Participant Gag Orders in Lower Courts
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the constitu-
tionality of participant gag orders. In the absence of a definitive
Court ruling, it is not surprising that the lower courts are sharply
divided and that there are few agreed-upon governing principles.
The above discussion of the differences among the courts on
whether the prior restraint doctrine applies to media challenges
to participant gag orders is indicative of the disagreement.
Young, Mechem, and Monaghan stress the importance of freedom
of speech and media newsgathering, apply the prior restraint doc-
trine, invoke strict scrutiny, and invalidate the gag order.310
RTNA and Dow Jones stress the incidental, indirect nature of the
burden on press newsgathering and the reduced speech protec-
tion of trial participants, especially lawyers, reject use of the prior
restraint doctrine, apply more deferential standards of review,
and uphold the gag order.311
Even prior to Nebraska Press, there was little consensus. The
tional prior restraint analysis-before I would allow a trial participant gag
order to be imposed.
Id.
309. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 288-305 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 264-87 and accompanying text.
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Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Tijerina,"' upheld a broad gag
order on extrajudicial commentary by attorneys, defendants, and
witnesses, stating: "The Supreme Court has never said that a
clear and present danger to the right of a fair trial must exist be-
fore a trial court can forbid extrajudicial statements about the
trial."313 The court then engaged in a one-sided balancing of inter-
ests and held that "reasonable likelihood" of harm to the integrity
of the trial justified the gag order.1 4 In Chase v. Robson,1 5 on the
other hand, the Seventh Circuit held that a gag order on trial
participants would be constitutional only if there was "a serious
and imminent threat to the administration of justice.' 31 6 The gag
order in the case, the court concluded, could not even satisfy the
"lesser standard" requiring a reasonable likelihood of harm.1 7
As I indicated earlier, after Nebraska Press, courts hearing
cases such as Ford and Levine employed the prior restraint doc-
trine and strict scrutiny to invalidate gag orders when trial par-
ticipants challenged them.318 In civil cases and state cases as well,
courts used the prior restraint doctrine to impose demanding
standards of First Amendment scrutiny and invalidate gag or-
ders.319 Yet in In re Russell,32 ° a murder trial involving Nazis and
KKK members, the Fourth Circuit used the "reasonable likeli-
hood" standard to affirm a gag order forbidding potential trial
312. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969).
313. Id. at 666.
314. Id. at 667.
315. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
316. Id. at 1061 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947)).
317. Id.
318. See supra notes 249-63 and accompanying text (discussing Ford and Levine).
319. See Bailey v. Sys. Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 101 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a
trial court order barring extrajudicial statements by litigants and counsel in a civil pro-
ceeding constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint under Nebraska Press); McBryde v.
Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders, 83 F. Supp. 2d 135, 174-75
(D.D.C. 1999) (holding that a confidentiality clause in a statute providing for judicial mis-
conduct proceedings was a prior restraint as applied to the judge who was the subject of
the proceeding and wanted to speak about the concluded proceeding to give his perspective
and attempt to vindicate his reputation); Sherrill v. Amerada Hess Corp., 504 S.E.2d 802,
808 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (reviewing gag order on trial participants in civil environmental
pollution case and finding that the order was a presumptively unconstitutional prior re-
straint because there were no record findings of prejudice and no findings that alterna-
tives would be insufficient); see also Davis v. Capital City Press, 78 F.3d 920, 928-29 (5th
Cir. 1996) holding that "[there is no possibility that publicity will prejudice potential ju-
rors," while avoiding the issue of whether an order prohibiting trial participants from
publicly discussing drafts of a proposed desegregation plan would be a prior restraint. See
generally DIENES, supra note 1, at 308-10.
320. 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1984).
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witnesses from discussing their proposed testimony with the
press.32' The gagged witnesses argued that the order was an un-
constitutional prior restraint, that there had been no evidentiary
hearing or specific findings made to justify the restraint, and that
the order was vague and overbroad.322 Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit concluded:
The tremendous publicity attending this trial, the potentially in-
flammatory and highly prejudicial statements that could reasonably
be expected from petitioners (and had indeed been openly forecast by
their counsel in proceedings before the trial judge), and the relative
ineffectiveness of the considered alternatives dictated the "strong
measure" of suppressing the speech of potential witnesses to ensure
a fair trial.323
Since the 1990s, following Gentile and the sharp controversy
over the trial judge's handling of the O.J. Simpson murder trial,
the confused state of the law on participant gag orders contin-
ues.324 Let me return to the three gag orders discussed in the
321. Id. at 1010. In United States v. King, 192 F.R.D. 527 (E.D. Va. 2000), the district
court restrained government witnesses from discussing their opinions and future testi-
mony with the press or in any way that might lead to their dissemination. Id. at 533. The
court found that such future news coverage is reasonably likely to prevent a fair trial. Id.
The court denied defendant's motion to prevent the broadcast of an already-taped inter-
view of a government witness because such an order would be a prior restraint and the
defendant could not show a clear and present danger that the interview would adversely
affect his ability to receive a fair trial. Id. at 531-33. The court found, however, that the
cumulative effect of such interviews, more of which were sure to follow unless witnesses
were enjoined, "present[ed] a high risk of prejudice to the defendants' right to a fair trial
by an impartial jury," id. at 533, that was unlikely to be mitigated by other measures such
as change of venue, postponement, or a searching voir dire. Id. at 533-35.
322. Russell, 726 F.2d at 1008.
323. Id. at 1010.
324. After this article was completed, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Brown,
218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000), upholding a participant gag order challenged by the defen-
dant in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 418.
Brown, a newly reelected insurance commissioner, was one of the figures indicted
in the politically charged prosecution of former Louisiana Governor Edwin W. Edwards.
Id. The district court entered sua sponte a participant gag order barring discussions "vith
'any public communications media' [concerning] anything about the case 'which could in-
terfere with a fair trial,' including statements 'intended to influence public opinion re-
garding the merits of [the] case,' with exceptions for matters of public record and matters
such as ascertions of innocence." Id.
While acknowledging that the case involved a "close call," the Fifth Circuit held
"that the gag order is constitutionally permissible because it [was] based on a reasonably
found substantial likelihood that comments from the lawyers and parties might well taint
the jury pool, either in the present case or one of the two related cases, is the least restric-
tive corrective measure available to ensure a fair trial, and is sufficiently narrowly
drawn." Id. at 423.
Noting that other circuits had applied some version of the clear and present dan-
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introduction.325
Judge Hiroshi Fujisaki issued the extremely broad order in the
O.J. Simpson civil case at a pretrial status conference, sua
sponte, without public fiotice, a hearing, or any record findings or
justification, and the record of the chamber proceedings was
sealed .1 6 The media, intervening, and one of the plaintiffs,
Fredric Goldman, moved to have the trial court vacate or modify
its order.3 27 Judge Fujisaki heard arguments and almost immedi-
ately read a modified order indicating a list of subjects that could
ger test to participant gag orders that the participants themselves challenged, the Fifth
Circuit instead cited In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir. 1984) and United States
v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666-67 (10th Cir. 1969), stating: "We decline to adopt the more
stringent tests advocated by the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits because Gentile ap-
pears to have foreclosed the applicability of those tests to the regulation of speech by trial
participants." Id. at 427. Gentile involved, however, a standing disciplinary rule, not a ju-
dicial gag order subject to the prior restraint doctrine. Further, Gentile involved attorney
extrajudicial commentary, not speech of the criminal defendant. But the Fifth Circuit de-
cided that the special fiduciary obligations on lawyers were not dispositive-"The mischief
that might have been visited upon the three related trials-primarily, jury tainting-
would have been the same whether prejudicial comments had been uttered by the parties
or their lawyers." Id. at 428. This is the same "mischief," however, that the Court in Ne-
braska Press held would not justify the use of a prior restraint on the media. Further, the
Court in Gentile had stressed the fiduciary obligations of lawyers as the basis for distin-
guishing Nebraska Press and applying the less demanding substantial likelihood of mate-
rial prejudice.
Applying its diminished standard of review, the appellate court in Brown affirmed
the trial court order. Id. at 432. Lest any doubt remain that Brown represents a marked
departure from the usual, more demanding standards of review, the appellate court held
that, while the district court had not followed "the good judicial practice" of making spe-
cific record findings about whether there were less restrictive means, the record was suffi-
cient to justify the district court's "clearly implied conclusion that ... other measures...
would be inappropriate or insufficient to adequately address the possible deleterious ef-
fects of enormous pretrial publicity on this case and the two related cases." Id. at 431.
While the court cited Nebraska Press, its deferential procedural and substantive review of
the trial court's order is in marked contrast to that opinion and its progeny.
325. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing the gag orders issued in
the O.J. Simpson civil case as well as the cases involving the World Trade Center bombing
and the Oklahoma City bombing). In addition to the three cases discussed in the text, see
Yuan, supra note 132 (discussing the gag order issued in the case of Amy Grossberg, who
pled guilty to manslaughter in the death of her newborn son).
326. Notice of Motion, supra, note 16, at *3. Compare Paul L. Hoffman, The Gag Order
in the O.J. Simpson Civil Action: Lessons to Be Learned?, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 333,
333 (1997) ("[tlhe gag order was issued for reasons that do not withstand First Amend-
ment scrutiny and, given the unique nature of the Simpson case, should not be used as
precedent for issuing such orders in future civil cases."), with Robert A. Pugsley, This
Courtroom Is Not a Television Studio: Why Judge Fujisaki Made the Correct Call in Gag-
ging Lawyers and Parties, and Banning the Cameras from the O.J. Simpson Civil Case, 17
Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 369, 381 (1997) ("Judge Fujisaki's orders ... produced a business-
like, legally focused trial.").
327. Memorandum and Order, CNN v. Superior Court, No. B104967, 1996 WL 536864,
at *2 (Cal. App. Ct., Sept. 17, 1996) (per curiam); Notice of Motion, supra note 16, at *1-2.
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not be discussed publicly.328 The list included not only commen-
tary on the evidence and the merits but also commentary on "the
court, including the trial proceedings."329 The media and Goldman
sought review.3 °
The state appellate court in CNN v. Superior Court vacated
those portions of the order that extended the ban to "'witnesses
under control of counsel' as well as the court's restrictions on ex-
trajudicial commentary regarding the court and its proceed-
ings. 33' The court, however, reasoning that the media was not re-
strained, rejected application of the prior restraint doctrine.332
Even though Goldman was a participant challenging the order,
the appellate court cited Gentile for the principle that increased
restrictions of the speech of trial participants are permitted.333
Because the present case involved a gag order, I cannot see how
Gentile is controlling on the applicability of the prior restraint
doctrine. Because Goldman is not an attorney, Gentile is of doubt-
ful relevance. The court reasoned further that, because the scope
of the order had been modified, the absence of findings and record
evidence justifying the order was not fatal.334 Judge Fujisaki's
concerns over the harmful effects of publicity on the defendant
were confirmed by the pervasive "circus atmosphere" in the
Simpson criminal proceedings, by "common human experience,"
by the absence of effective alternatives for controlling prejudice,
and by the fact that the jury would be unsequestered.335 The ref-
erence to counsel in the order was interpreted as limited to coun-
sel in the civil proceedings, allowing counsel from the criminal
proceeding, who were fully familiar with all the evidence and
witnesses, to serve as "talking heads" in the civil proceeding.336 It
is difficult to understand what significantly greater prejudice
328. Memorandum and Order, CNN, 1996 WL 536864, at *3-4 (per curiam).
329. Id. at *3.
330. Id. at *2.
331. Id. at*10.
332. Id. at *6.
333. Id. at *7.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at *10 ("We believe [this language] may reasonably be construed to apply only
to an attorney's employee, agent or representative acting as such in this litigation."). See
generally Stephen Jones & Holly Hillerman, McVeigh, McJustice, McMedia, 1998 U. CHi.
LEGAL F. 53 (providing defense counsel's analysis of fair trial-free press issues in McVeigh
case); John A. Walton, From O.J. to Tim McVeigh and Beyond: The Supreme Court's Total-




would come from extrajudicial commentary by the attorneys and
participants in the civil proceeding than from the attorneys in the
criminal case.
Judge Matsch entered his April 16, 1997, gag order in the
Oklahoma bombing trial of Timothy McVeigh after a conference
with counsel in chambers.33 ' Again, the press was not provided
with notice or an opportunity to be heard. As indicated above,33
this order was extremely sweeping as to subject matter, parties,
and duration, but there was no showing made as to why this
broad gag order, which replaced an earlier more limited restraint,
was needed. The absence of findings on harm and record evidence
is especially troublesome because the jury had been impaneled
and there already had been extensive publicity before the judge
issued the order. Nevertheless, efforts by counsel for McVeigh,
joined by two media groups and counsel for Nichols, to vacate or
modify the order were rejected. Judge Matsch stated: "This case
calls for a blanket bar on out of court comments because no lesser
restriction would adequately protect against a substantial likeli-
hood of prejudicing the proceedings."339 The media was not re-
strained and restraints on trial counsel and their associates were
justified, he said, because "[t]hey are officers of the court with an
obligation to the system of justice."340
Following the convictions of McVeigh and Nichols, but while
their appeals were still pending, the district court, on the gov-
ernment's motion, limited some of its restrictions in order to allow
federal authorities to cooperate with Oklahoma authorities inves-
tigating the bombing.34' The Tenth Circuit, affirming the order,
declared that Judge Matsch had made "a very careful and delib-
erate examination of the issues involved" and dismissed possible
prejudice to the defendant's rights on appeal and in any new trial
as "speculative."342
In the third gag order discussed in the introduction, emanating
from the World Trade Center bombing, the appellate process pro-
duced an opinion more consistent with First Amendment juris-
prudence. In United States v. Salameh,43 the Second Circuit
337. United States v. McVeigh, 1997 WL 202537, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 16, 1997) (No. 96-
CR-68-M) (order prohibiting out of court comments).
338. See supra text accompanying note 18.
339. United States v. McVeigh, 964 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D. Colo. 1997).
340. Id. (citing Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1010, 1075 (1991)).
341. United States v. McVeigh, 157 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1998).
342. Id. at 811-12, 814.
343. 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993).
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overturned Judge Duffy's sweeping gag order as an overbroad in-
trusion on freedom of speech. 3" The appellate court expressly in-
voked the prior restraint doctrine.345 While accepting Gentile's
premise that attorney speech can be subjected to greater limita-
tions than other citizens, the Second Circuit stressed that "the
limitations on attorney speech should be no broader than neces-
sary to protect the integrity of the judicial system and the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial .... ." The trial court must consider
the availability of less restrictive remedies as well as the probable
effectiveness of the gag order.347 Finally, the Salameh court indi-
cated the need for "proper notice to the parties and an opportu-
nity to be heard."34 This is the only one of the three cases that
approximates the kind of First Amendment analysis that I am
urging.
V. THE NEED FOR STRICT SCRUTINY
The analysis of the judicial handling of disciplinary rules in
Part Three and gag orders in Part Four convinces me of the need
to return to basic First Amendment principles in dealing with re-
straints on trial participants. First, such restraints are content-
based regulations of political speech normally subject to strict
scrutiny. Second, gag orders on trial participants are content-
based prior restraints on speech subject to a heavy presumption
of invalidity. Such restraint is constitutionally permissible only if
strict scrutiny or its functional equivalent, the clear and present
danger doctrine, is satisfied. Third, the fact that the party re-
strained is a trial participant, even an attorney, should not deni-
grate these First Amendment principles. Fourth, the press should
have standing to raise the First Amendment rights of trial par-
ticipants and challenge the participant gag order as a prior re-
straint. Further, in such media challenges, gag orders on trial
participants should be treated as prior restraints on the First
Amendment right of newsgathering. In short, the press should be
able to challenge such censorship in order to ensure the flow of in-
formation to the public.
344. Id. at 447.
345. Id. at 446-47.





These doctrinal principles are sufficient to establish the need
for strict scrutiny of restraints on trial participants. Nevertheless,
I want to conclude this analysis by stressing again the vital First
Amendment values that such restraints put at risk.
First, consideration should be given to the free speech rights of
trial participants as persons and as citizens. While the courts
regularly recite the mantra that trial participants, even lawyers,
do not lose their First Amendment rights when they become in-
volved in a trial, it is often no more than words. When the gag or-
der includes witnesses, arbitrarily caught up in the litigation, free
speech values sometimes gain added emphasis. For trial partici-
pants, especially lawyers, however, the value of being able to
speak on subjects of their choice and the social value of furthering
comment on matters of public concern are denigrated. I am not
suggesting that free speech rights are absolute, but there should
be a meaningful standard of justification before they are sacri-
ficed.
A person charged with a crime is immediately at a disadvan-
tage. The government's charges are communicated to the public;
officials, having established lines of communication to the press,
can build the case for his or her guilt. But the legally educated,
probably more articulate, legal representative of the defendant is
subject to standing disciplinary restraints limiting extrajudicial
commentary. The courts can impose sweeping and vague gag or-
ders restraining counsel and parties alike. Lawyers, however,
have a fiduciary duty to represent zealously, consistent with the
law, their client's interest. It does not seem excessive to allow a
lawyer to explain and to argue the merits of his or her client's
case and to reply to charges communicated in the media.
"While restraints often are justified as necessary to prevent
prejudicial publicity violative of a defendant's fair trial rights,
most restraints are more likely to handicap the defense. It is un-
likely that restraints actually will seriously curtail publicity.
Where will the news come from if restraints on trial participants
are imposed, and how will the restraints affect the accuracy of the
news information? There is no sure answer, but many journalists
have a long-term relationship with government sources. Defense
lawyers are an intermittent source of information. Leaks from the
government may well produce publicity adverse to a defendant
who is restrained from responding. Inaccurate publicity may go
unanswered. It would seem far better to provide for a more bal-
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anced, fairer, more accurate communication process by allowing
only narrow restraints where there is a threat of serious harm
and no alternative to restraint is available.
We must also consider the First Amendment right of the public
to receive information and ideas, which is realized by the right of
the press to gather the news. In cases establishing a First
Amendment-based right of public access, the courts stressed
these rights as a predicate for imposing demanding standards of
justification before public proceedings could be closed.149 The First
Amendment values relied upon in the access cases also apply to
restraints on trial participants. For example, the courts have
stressed that the public needs to be assured that justice is being
administered fairly. Media publicity is important to counter
abuses of the public's trust. Trial participants are in a unique po-
sition to provide information, commentary, and perspectives rele-
vant to such functional values. When judges have sought to avoid
press criticism by silencing the press critics, the courts protected
the critics. If participants and lawyers seek to criticize the fair-
ness of the proceedings or to criticize officials, they should be al-
lowed to use the press to make their case.
Justice Brennan, in Richmond Newspapers, stressed the role of
access in assuring accurate factfinding.35 ° Allowing trial partici-
pants to state their theory of the case, to defend their position to
the public, and to question the adequacy of the case against them
can help to restore balance to what is often an uneven playing
field. For example, Gentile sought to tell the public that his client
was being used as a scapegoat to cover up the actions of a corrupt
police department.3 5' Such trial participant commentary may
even elicit additional information useful to the fair disposition of
the case.
Trial participants often have reform goals that transcend the
immediate dispute. For example, Margaret Sanger saw her trials
as an opportunity to educate the public on birth control. 52 Simi-
larly, Dr. Jack Kevorkian sought to use his trials as a forum to
349. See supra notes 103-29 and accompanying text (discussing the right of public ac-
cess).
350. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's con-
currence in Richmond Newspapers).
351. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1010, 1034 (1991).
352. See C. THOMAS DIENES, LAW, POLITICS AND BIRTH CONTROL (1972).
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stimulate public discussion of the right to die. 3 Public interest
groups often use civil suits to expose public and private abuses.354
To silence such trial participants denies them a historic forum for
airing their causes.
More generally, there is the need to educate the public con-
cerning the workings of our justice system. Almost all states al-
low for some televising of legal proceedings.355 As in the context of
participant restraints, there are expressions of concern that such
media coverage will produce prejudice; but numerous empirical
studies, however, have suggested that such concerns are exagger-
ated and are far outweighed by the benefits of using the media to
expose the public to the courtroom.356 Similar social benefits can
result from allowing media access to those most directly involved
and informed, the trial participants.
I am not arguing for the elimination of restraints. Indeed, I do
not agree with the argument of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
that the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van should be applied to restraints on trial participants. 7 Adop-
tion of the actual malice standard would prevent restraint of any
truthful speech; only calculated falsehoods could be regulated. I
believe there are times, however, when potential harm outweighs
even the values of truthful participant speech. I believe it is pos-
sible that extrajudicial disclosure of confidential discovery evi-
dence, for example, might seriously damage the fair administra-
tion of justice. I am not prepared to adopt such an absolutist
position at this time. Stringent standards of review such as those
used in Press-Enterprise I & II, strict scrutiny, and the clear and
present danger test accommodate the concerns underlying the
use of participant speech restraints while protecting the free
speech interests of the speaker, the fair trial rights of the parties,
and the First Amendment interests of the public.
353. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 870-71.
354. See Swartz, supra note 11, at 1423 ("Civil litigation is often used to raise and de-
bate many important social and political issues.").
355. See DIENES, supra note 1, at ch. 4.
356. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF FEDERAL
PROCEEDINGS, (1994); N.Y. STATE COM.I TO REVIEW AUDIO-VISuAL COVERAGE OF COURT
PROCEEDINGS, AN OPEN COURTROOM: CAMERAS IN NEW YORK COURTS (1997).
357. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22.
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